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Abstract
Model-based algorithms—algorithms that decouple learning of the model and planning given the
model—are widely used in reinforcement learning practice and theoretically shown to achieve optimal
sample efficiency for single-agent reinforcement learning in Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). How-
ever, for multi-agent reinforcement learning inMarkov games, the current best known sample complexity
for model-based algorithms is rather suboptimal and compares unfavorably against recent model-free ap-
proaches. In this paper, we present a sharp analysis of model-based self-play algorithms for multi-agent
Markov games. We design an algorithm Optimistic Nash Value Iteration (Nash-VI) for two-player zero-
sum Markov games that is able to output an ǫ-approximate Nash policy in O˜(H3SAB/ǫ2) episodes of
game playing, where S is the number of states, A,B are the number of actions for the two players re-
spectively, andH is the horizon length. This is the first algorithm that matches the information-theoretic
lower bound Ω(H3S(A + B)/ǫ2) except for a min {A,B} factor, and compares favorably against the
best known model-free algorithm if min {A,B} = o(H3). In addition, our Nash-VI outputs a single
Markov policy with optimality guarantee, while existing sample-efficient model-free algorithms output
a nested mixture of Markov policies that is in general non-Markov and rather inconvenient to store and
execute. We further adapt our analysis to designing a provably efficient task-agnostic algorithm for zero-
sum Markov games, and designing the first line of provably sample-efficient algorithms for multi-player
general-sumMarkov games.
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the problem multi-agent reinforcement learning (multi-agent RL), in which
multiple agents learn to make decisions in an unknown environment in order to maximize their (own) cumu-
lative rewards. Multi-agent RL has achieved significant recent success in traditionally hard AI challenges
including large-scale strategy games (such as GO) [31, 32], real-time video games involving team play such
as Starcraft and Dota2 [25, 34], as well as behavior learning in complex social scenarios [4]. Achieving
human-like (or super-human) performance in these games using multi-agent RL typically requires a large
number of samples (steps of game playing) due to the necessity of exploration, and how to improve the
sample complexity of multi-agent RL has been an important research question.
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One prevalent approach towards solving multi-agent RL is model-based methods, that is, to use the
existing visitation data to build an estimate of the model (i.e. transition dynamics and rewards), run an offline
planning algorithm on the estimated model to obtain the policy, and play the policy in the environment.
Such a principle underlies some of the earliest single-agent online RL algorithms such as E3 [19] and
RMax [6], and is conceptually appealing for multi-agent RL too since the multi-agent structure does not add
complexity onto the model estimation part and only requires an appropriate multi-agent planning algorithm
(such as value iteration for games [29]) in a black-box fashion. On the other hand, model-free methods do
not directly build estimates of the model, but instead directly estimate the value functions or action-value
(Q) functions of the problem at the optimal/equilibrium policies, and play the greedy policies with respect
to the estimated value functions. Model-free algorithms has also been well developed for multi-agent RL
such as friend-or-foe Q-Learning [22] and Nash Q-Learning [12].
While both model-based and model-free algorithms have been shown to be provably efficient in multi-
agent RL in a recent line of work [2, 37, 3], a more precise understanding of the optimal sample complexities
within these two types of algorithms (respectively) is still lacking. In the specific setting of two-player zero-
sum Markov games, the current best sample complexity for model-based algorithms is achieved by the
VI-ULCB (Value Iteration with Upper/Lower Confidence Bounds) algorithm [2, 37]: In a tabular Markov
game with S states, {A,B} actions for the two players, and horizon length H , VI-ULCB is able to find an
ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium policy in O˜(H4S2AB/ǫ2) episodes of game playing. However, compared
with the information-theoretic lower bound Ω(H3S(A+B)/ǫ2), this rate has suboptimal dependencies on
all ofH , S, and A,B. In contrast, the current best sample complexity for model-free algorithms is achieved
by Nash V-Learning [3], which finds an ǫ-approximate Nash policy in O˜(H6S(A+B)/ǫ2) episodes. Com-
pared with the lower bound, this is tight except for a poly(H) factor, which may seemingly suggest that
model-free algorithms could be superior to model-based ones in multi-agent RL. However, such a conclusion
would be in stark contrast to the single-agent MDP setting, where it is known that model-based algorithms
are able to achieve minimax optimal sample complexities [13, 1]. It naturally arises whether model-free
algorithms are indeed superior in multi-agent settings, or whether the existing analyses of model-based
algorithms are not tight. This motivates us to ask the following research question:
Question: How sample-efficient are model-based algorithms in multi-agent RL?
In this paper, we advance the theoretical understandings of multi-agent RL by presenting a sharp analysis
of model-based algorithms on Markov games. Our core contribution is the design of a new model-based
algorithm Optimistic Nash Value Iteration (Nash-VI) that achieves an almost optimal sample complexity for
zero-sum Markov games and improves significantly over existing model-based approaches. We summarize
our main contributions as follows. A comparison between our and prior results can be found in Table 1.
• We design a new model-based algorithm Optimistic Nash Value Iteration (Nash-VI) that provably
finds ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium for Markov games in O˜(H3SAB/ǫ2) episodes of game playing (Sec-
tion 3). This improves over the best existing model-based algorithm by O(HS) and is the first algorithm
that matches the sample complexity lower bound except for a O˜(min {A,B}) factor, showing that model-
based algorithms can indeed achieve an almost optimal sample complexity. Further, unlike state-of-the-art
model-free algorithms such as Nash V-Learning [3], this algorithm achieves in addition a O˜(√T ) regret
bound, and outputs a simple Markov policy (instead of a nested mixture of Markov policies as returned by
Nash V-Learning).
• We design an alternative algorithm Optimistic Value Iteration with Zero Reward (VI-Zero) that is
able to perform task-agnostic (reward-free) learning for multiple Markov games sharing the same transition
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Table 1: Sample complexity (the required number of episodes) for algorithms to find ǫ-approximate Nash
equlibrium policies in zero-sum Markov games.
Algorithm
Task-
Agnostic
√
T -
Regret
Sample Complexity Output Policy
Model
-based
VI-explore [2] Yes O˜(H5S2AB/ǫ2)
a single
Markov policy
VI-ULCB [2] Yes O˜(H4S2AB/ǫ2)
OMVI-SM [37] Yes O˜(H4S3A3B3/ǫ2)
Algorithm 2 Yes O˜(H4SAB/ǫ2)
Algorithm 1 Yes O˜(H3SAB/ǫ2)
Model
-free
Nash Q-learning [3] O˜(H5SAB/ǫ2) a nested
mixture of
Markov policiesNash V-learning [3] O˜(H6S(A+B)/ǫ2)
Lower Bound [15] - - Ω(H3S(A+B)/ǫ2) -
(Section 4). For N > 1 games with the same transition and different (known) rewards, VI-Zero can find ǫ-
approximate Nash policy for all games simultaneously in O˜(H4SAB logN/ǫ2) episodes of game playing,
which scales logarithmically in the number of games.
• We design the first line of sample-efficient algorithms for multi-player general-sum Markov games.
In a multi-player game withM players and Ai actions per player, we show that an ǫ near-optimal policy can
be found in O˜(H4S2∏i∈[M ]Ai/ǫ2) episodes, where the desired optimality can be either one of Nash equi-
librium, correlated equilibrium (CE), or coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE). We achieve this guarantee by
either a multi-player version of Nash-VI or a multi-player version of reward-free value iteration (Section 5).
1.1 Related Work
Markov games. Markov games (or stochastic games) are proposed in the early 1950s [29]. They are
widely used to model multi-agent RL. Learning the Nash equilibria of Markov games has been studied
in Littman [21, 22], Hu and Wellman [12], Hansen et al. [11], Lee et al. [20], where the transition matrix
and reward are assumed to be known, or in the asymptotic setting where the number of data goes to infin-
ity. These results do not directly apply to the non-asymptotic setting where the transition and reward are
unknown and only a limited amount of data are available for estimating them.
Another line of work assumes certain strong reachability assumptions under which sophisticated explo-
ration strategies are not required. A prevalent approach is to assume access to simulators (generative models)
that enable the agent to directly sample transition and reward information for any state-action pair. In this
setting, Jia et al. [14], Sidford et al. [30], Zhang et al. [39] provide non-asymptotic bounds on the number of
calls to the simulator for finding an ǫ approximate Nash equilibrium. Wei et al. [36] studies Markov games
under an alternative assumption that no matter what strategy one agent sticks to, the other agent can always
reach all states by playing a certain policy.
Non-asymptotic guarantees without reachability assumptions. The recent work of Bai and Jin [2],
Xie et al. [37] provide the first line of non-asymptotic sample complexity guarantees on learning Markov
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games without these reachability assumptions, in which exploration is essential. However, both results
suffer from highly suboptimal sample complexity. The results of Xie et al. [37] also apply to the linear
function approximation setting. More recently, two model-free algorithms—Nash Q-Learning and Nash V-
Learning—are shown to achieve better sample complexity guarantees [3]. In particular, the Nash V-learning
algorithm achieves the near-optimal dependence on S, A and B. However, the dependence on H is worse
than our results and the output policy is a nested mixture, which is hard to implement. We compare our
results with existing non-asymptotic guarantees in Table 1.
We remark that the classical R-max algorithm Brafman and Tennenholtz [6] also provides provable
guarantees for learning Markov games. However, Brafman and Tennenholtz [6] uses a weaker definition
of regret (similar to the online setting in Xie et al. [37]), and consequently their result does not imply any
sample complexity result for finding Nash equilibrium policies.
Adversarial MDPs. Another way to model the multi-player bahavior is to use adversarial MDPs. Most
work in this line considers the setting with adversarial rewards [42, 28, 16], where the reward can be ma-
nipulated by an adversary arbitrarily and the goal is to compete with the optimal (stationary) policy in
hindsight. Adversarial MDP with changing dynamics is computationally hard even under full-information
feedback [38]. Notice these results do not directly imply provable self-play algorithms in our setting, be-
cause the opponent in Markov games can affect both the reward and the transition.
Single-agent RL. There is a rich literature on reinforcement learning in MDPs (see e.g., Jaksch et al.
[13], Osband et al. [27], Azar et al. [1], Dann et al. [8], Strehl et al. [33], Jin et al. [15]). MDP is a
special case of Markov games, where only a single agent interacts with a stochastic environment. For
the tabular episodic setting with nonstationary dynamics and no simulators, the best sample complexity is
O˜(H3SA/ǫ2), achieved by model-based algorithm in Azar et al. [1] and model-free algorithms in Zhang
et al. [41] respectively, where S is the number of states, A is the number of actions, H is the length of each
episode. Both of them match the lower bound Ω(H3SA/ǫ2) [13, 26, 15].
Reward-free and task-agnostic exploration. Jin et al. [17] proposes a new paradigm of learning anMDP,
which they called reward-free exploration. In this setting, the agent goes through a two-stage process. In the
exploration phase the agent can interacts with the environment without knowing the reward function and in
the planning phase the reward function is given and the agent needs output a policy. The goal is to make the
output policy near optimal for any given reward function. A closely related setting is task-agnostic learning,
where the reward function is determined at the very beginning but not revealed until the planning phase.
Notice algorithms for task-agnostic learning can also be transferred to reward-free exploration by taking
union bound w.r.t. different possible reward function. In Table 1, VI-explore [2] and Algorithm 2 can also
be applied to this setting.
Jin et al. [17] also proposes an algorithm, which first finds a covering policy to maximize the probability
to reach each state separately and then collects data following this policy. Zhang et al. [40] takes a different
approach by first runs the optimistic Q-learning algorithm [15] with zero reward to explore the environment,
and then they utilizes the trajectories collected to compute a policy in an incremental manner. Wang et al.
[35] follows a simialr scheme, but studies reward-free exploration in linear-parametrized MDPs.
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2 Preliminaries
In this paper, we consider Markov Games [MGs, 29, 21], which are also known as stochastic games in
the literature. Markov games is the generalization of standard Markov Decision Processes (MDP) into the
multi-player setting, where each player seeks to maximize her own utility. For simplicity, in this section we
describe the important special case of two-player zero-sum games, and return to the general formulation in
Appendix 5.
Formally, we consider the tabular episodic version of two-player zero-sum Markov game, which we
denote as MG(H,S,A,B,P, r). Here H is the number of steps in each episode, S is the set of states with
|S| ≤ S, (A,B) are the sets of actions of the max-player and the min-player respectively with |A| ≤ A and
|B| ≤ B, P = {Ph}h∈[H] is a collection of transition matrices, so that Ph(·|s, a, b) gives the distribution of
the next state if action pair (a, b) is taken at state s at step h, and r = {rh}h∈[H] is a collection of reward
functions, where rh : S × A × B → [0, 1] is the deterministic reward function at step h.1 This reward
represents both the gain of the max-player and the loss of the min-player, making the problem a zero-sum
Markov game.
In each episode of this MG, we start with a fixed initial state s1. At each step h ∈ [H], both players
observe state sh ∈ S , and pick their own actions ah ∈ A and bh ∈ B simultaneously. Then, both players
observe the actions of their opponent, receive reward rh(sh, ah, bh), and then the environment transitions to
the next state sh+1 ∼ Ph(·|sh, ah, bh). The episode ends when sH+1 is reached.
Policy, value function. A (Markov) policy µ of the max-player is a collection of H functions {µh : S →
∆A}h∈[H], each mapping from a state to a distribution of actions. (Here ∆A is the probability simplex over
action set A.) Similarly, a policy ν of the min-player is a collection of H functions {νh : S → ∆B}h∈[H].
We use the notation µh(a|s) and νh(b|s) to represent the probability of taking action a or b for state s at step
h under Markov policy µ or ν respectively.
We use V µ,νh : S → R to denote the value function at step h under policy µ and ν, so that V µ,νh (s) gives
the expected cumulative rewards received under policy µ and ν, starting from s at step h:
V µ,νh (s) := Eµ,ν
[∑H
h′=h rh′(sh′ , ah′ , bh′)
∣∣∣ sh = s] . (1)
We also define Qµ,νh : S × A × B → R to be the Q-value function at step h so that Qµ,νh (s, a, b) gives the
cumulative rewards received under policy µ and ν, starting from (s, a, b) at step h:
Qµ,νh (s, a, b) := Eµ,ν
[∑H
h′=h rh′(sh′ , ah′ , bh′)
∣∣∣ sh = s, ah = a, bh = b] . (2)
For simplicity, we define operator Ph as [PhV ](s, a, b) := Es′∼Ph(·|s,a,b)V (s
′) for any value function V .
We also use notation [DπQ](s) := E(a,b)∼π(·,·|s)Q(s, a, b) for any action-value function Q. By definition of
value functions, we have the Bellman equation
Qµ,νh (s, a, b) = (rh + PhV
µ,ν
h+1)(s, a, b), V
µ,ν
h (s) = (Dµh×νhQ
µ,ν
h )(s)
for all (s, a, b, h) ∈ S ×A× B × [H], and at the (H + 1)th step we have V µ,νH+1(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S .
1We assume the rewards in [0, 1] for normalization. Our results directly generalize to randomized reward functions, since
learning the transition is more difficult than learning the reward.
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Best response and Nash equilibrium. For any policy of the max-player µ, there exists a best response of
the min-player, which is a policy ν†(µ) satisfying V
µ,ν†(µ)
h (s) = infν V
µ,ν
h (s) for any (s, h) ∈ S × [H]. We
denote V µ,†h := V
µ,ν†(µ)
h . By symmetry, we can also define µ
†(ν) and V †,νh . It is further known (cf. Filar
and Vrieze [10]) that there exist policies µ⋆, ν⋆ that are optimal against the best responses of the opponents,
in the sense that
V µ
⋆,†
h (s) = supµ V
µ,†
h (s), V
†,ν⋆
h (s) = infν V
†,ν
h (s), for all (s, h).
We call these optimal strategies (µ⋆, ν⋆) the Nash equilibrium of the Markov game, which satisfies the
following minimax equation 2:
supµ infν V
µ,ν
h (s) = V
µ⋆,ν⋆
h (s) = infν supµ V
µ,ν
h (s).
Intuitively, a Nash equilibrium gives a solution in which no player has anything to gain by changing only
her own policy. We further abbreviate the values of Nash equilibrium V µ
⋆,ν⋆
h and Q
µ⋆,ν⋆
h as V
⋆
h and Q
⋆
h. We
refer readers to Appendix A for Bellman optimality equations for (the value functions of) the best responses
and the Nash equilibrium.
Learning Objective. We measure the suboptimality of any pair of general policies (µˆ, νˆ) using the gap
between their performance and the performance of the optimal strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) when playing
against the best responses respectively:
V †,νˆ1 (s1)− V µˆ,†1 (s1) =
[
V †,νˆ1 (s1)− V ⋆1 (s1)
]
+
[
V ⋆1 (s1)− V µˆ,†1 (s1)
]
Definition 1 (ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium). A pair of general policies (µˆ, νˆ) is an ǫ-approximate Nash
equilibrium, if V †,νˆ1 (s1)− V µˆ,†1 (s1) ≤ ǫ.
Definition 2 (Regret). Let (µk, νk) denote the policies deployed by the algorithm in the kth episode. After
a total of K episodes, the regret is defined as
Regret(K) =
K∑
k=1
(V †,ν
k
1 − V µ
k,†
1 )(s1).
One goal of reinforcement learning is to design algorithms for Markov games that can find an ǫ-
approximate Nash equilibrium using a number of episodes that is small in its dependency on S,A,B,H
as well as 1/ǫ (PAC sample complexity bound). An alternative goal is to design algorithms for Markov
games that achieves regret that is sublinear in K , and polynomial in S,A,B,H (regret bound). We remark
that any sublinear regret algorithm can be directly converted to a polynomial-sample PAC algorithm via the
standard online-to-batch conversion (see e.g., Jin et al. [15]).
3 Optimistic Nash Value Iteration
In this section, we present our main algorithm—Optimistic Nash Value Iteration (Nash-VI), and provide its
theoretical guarantee.
2The minimax theorem here is different from the one for matrix games, i.e. maxφminψ φ
⊤Aψ = minψ maxφ φ
⊤Aψ for any
matrix A, since here V
µ,ν
h (s) is in general not bilinear in µ, ν.
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3.1 Algorithm description
We describe our Nash-VI Algorithm 1. In each episode, the algorithm can be decomposed into two parts.
• Line 3-13 (Optimistic planning from the estimated model): Performs value iteration with bonus using
the empirical estimate of the transition Pˆ, and computes a new (joint) policy π which is “greedy” with
respect to the estimated value functions;
• Line 16-19 (Play the policy and update the model estimate): Executes the policy π, collects samples,
and updates the estimate of the transition Pˆ.
At a high-level, this two-phase strategy is standard in the majority of model-based RL algorithms, and also
underlies provably efficient model-based algorithms such as UCBVI for single-agent (MDP) setting [1] and
VI-ULCB for the two-player Markov game setting [2]. However, VI-ULCB has two undesirable drawbacks:
the sample complexity is not tight in any ofH , S, and A,B dependency, and the runtime is PPAD-complete
(a complexity class conjectured to be computationally hard [9]).
As we elaborate in the following, our Nash-VI algorithm differs from VI-ULCB in a few important tech-
nical aspects, which allows it to significantly improve the sample complexity over VI-ULCB, and ensures
that our algorithm terminates in polynomial time.
Before digging into explanations of techniques, we remark that line 14-15 is only used for computing the
output policies. It chooses policy πout to be the policy in the episode with minimum gap (V 1−V 1)(s1). Our
final output policies (µout, νout) are simply the marginal policies of πout. That is, for all (s, h) ∈ S × [H],
µouth (·|s) :=
∑
b∈B π
out
h (·, b|s), and νouth (·|s) :=
∑
a∈A π
out
h (a, ·|s).
3.1.1 Overview of techniques
Auxiliary bonus γ. The major improvement over VI-ULCB [2] comes from the use of a different style of
bonus term γ (line 8), in addition to the standard bonus β (line 7), in value iteration steps (line 9-10). This
is also the main technical contribution of our Nash-VI algorithm. This auxiliary bonus γ is computed by
applying the empirical transition matrix Pˆh to the gap at the next step V h+1 − V h+1, This is very different
from standard bonus β, which is typically designed according to the concentration inequalities.
The main purpose of these value iteration steps (line 9-10) is to ensure that the estimated values Qh
and Q
h
are with high probability the upper bound and the lower bound of the Q-value of the current policy
when facing best responses (see Lemma 20 and 21 for more details) 3. In order to achieve so, prior work
[2] only adds bonus β, which needs to scale as large as O˜(√S/t). In contrast, the inclusion of auxiliary
bonus γ in our algorithm allows a much smaller choice for bonus β—which scales only as O˜(√1/t)—
while still maintaining valid confidence bounds. This technique alone brings down the sample complexity
to O˜(H4SAB/ǫ2), removing an entire S factor compared to VI-ULCB. Furthermore, the coefficient in γ is
only c/H for some absolute constant c, which ensures that the introduction of error term γ would not hurt
the overall sample complexity up to a constant factor.
Bernstein concentration. Our Nash-VI allows two choices of the bonus function β = BONUS(t, σˆ2):
Hoeffding type: c(
√
H2ι/t+H2Sι/t), Bernstein type: c(
√
σˆ2ι/t+H2Sι/t). (3)
3We remark that the current policy is random. This is different from the single-agent setting, where the algorithm only seeks
to provide an upper bound of the value of the optimal policy where the optimal policy is not random. Due to this difference, the
techniques in Azar, et al. [1] can not be directly applied here.
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Algorithm 1 Optimistic Nash Value Iteration (Nash-VI)
1: Initialize: for any (s, a, b, h), Qh(s, a, b)← H , Qh(s, a, b)← 0, ∆← H , Nh(s, a, b)← 0.
2: for episode k = 1, . . . ,K do
3: for step h = H,H − 1, . . . , 1 do
4: for (s, a, b) ∈ S ×A× B do
5: t← Nh(s, a, b).
6: if t > 0 then
7: β ← BONUS(t, V̂h[(V h+1 + V h+1)/2](s, a, b)).
8: γ ← (c/H)P̂h(V h+1 − V h+1)(s, a, b).
9: Qh(s, a, b)← min{(rh + P̂hV h+1)(s, a, b) + γ + β,H}.
10: Q
h
(s, a, b)← max{(rh + P̂hV h+1)(s, a, b) − γ − β, 0}.
11: for s ∈ S do
12: πh(·, ·|s)← CCE(Qh(s, ·, ·), Qh(s, ·, ·)).
13: V h(s)← (DπhQh)(s); V h(s)← (DπhQh)(s).
14: if (V 1 − V 1)(s1) < ∆ then
15: ∆← (V 1 − V 1)(s1) and πout ← π.
16: for step h = 1, . . . ,H do
17: take action (ah, bh) ∼ πh(·, ·|sh), observe reward rh and next state sh+1.
18: add 1 to Nh(sh, ah, bh) and Nh(sh, ah, bh, sh+1).
19: P̂h(·|sh, ah, bh)← Nh(sh, ah, bh, ·)/Nh(sh, ah, bh).
20: Output (µout, νout) that are the marginal policies of πout.
where σˆ2 is the estimated variance, ι is the logarithmic factors and c is absolute constant. The Vˆ in line 7 is
the empirical variance operator defined as V̂hV = P̂hV
2− (P̂hV )2 for any V ∈ [0,H]S . The design of both
bonuses stem from the Hoeffding and Bernstein concentration inequalities. Further, the Bernstein bonus uses
a sharper concentration, which saves an H factor in sample complexity compared to the Hoeffding bonus
(similar to the single-agent setting [1]). This further reduces the sample complexity to O˜(H3SAB/ǫ2)
which matches the lower bound in all H,S, ǫ factors.
Coarse Correlated Equalibirum (CCE). The prior algorithm VI-ULCB [2] computes the “greedy” pol-
icy with respect to the estimated value functions by directly computing the Nash equilibrium for theQ-value
at each step h. However, since the algorithm maintains both the upper confidence bound and lower confi-
dence bound of the Q-value, this leads to the requirement to compute the Nash equilibrium for a two-player
general-sum matrix game, which is in general PPAD-complete [9].
To overcome this computational challenge, we compute a relaxation of Nash equilibrium—Coarse Cor-
related Equalibirum (CCE) instead, a technique first introduced by Xie et al. [37] to address reinforcement
learning problems in Markov Games. Formally, for any pair of matrices Q,Q ∈ [0,H]A×B , CCE(Q,Q)
returns a distribution π ∈ ∆A×B such that
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b) ≥ max
a⋆
E(a,b)∼πQ(a
⋆, b), E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b) ≤ min
b⋆
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b
⋆). (4)
A CCE always exists, since Nash equilibrium is also a CCE and a Nash equilibrium always exists. Further-
more, a CCE can be computed by linear programming in polynomial time. We remark that different from
Nash equilibrium where the policies of each player are independent, the policies given by CCE is in general
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correlated for each player. Therefore, executing such policy requires the cooperation of two players during
the training phase.
3.2 Theoretical guarantees
Now we are ready to present the theoretical guarantees for Algorithm 1. We let πk denote the policy
computed in line 12 in the kth episode, and µk, νk denote the marginal policy of πk for each player.
Theorem 3 (Nash-VI with Hoeffding bonus). For any p ∈ (0, 1], letting ι = log(SABT/p), then with
probability at least 1− p, Algorithm 1 with Hoeffding type bonus (3) (with some absolute c > 0) achieves:
• (V †,ν
out
1 − V µ
out,†
1 )(s1) ≤ ǫ, if the number of episodes K ≥ Ω(H4SABι/ǫ2 +H3S2ABι2/ǫ).
• Regret(K) =
∑K
k=1(V
†,νk
1 − V µ
k,†
1 )(s1) ≤ O(
√
H3SABTι+H3S2ABι2).
Theorem 3 provides both a sample complexity bound and a regret bound for Nash-VI to find a ǫ-
approximate Nash equilibrium. For small ǫ ≤ H/(Sι), the sample complexity scales as O˜(H4SAB/ǫ2).
Similarly, for large T ≥ H3S3ABι3, the regret scales as O˜(
√
H3SABT ), where T = KH is the total
number of steps played within K episodes. Theorem 3 is significant in that it improves the sample com-
plexity of the model-based algorithm in Markov games from S2 to S (and the regret from S to
√
S). This is
achieved by adding the new auxiliary bonus γ in value iteration steps as explained in Section 3.1. The proof
of Theorem 3 can be found in Appendix C.1.
Our next theorem states that when using Bernstein bonus instead of Hoeffding bonus as in (3), the
sample complexity of Nash-VI algorithm can be further improved by a H factor in the leading order term
(and the regret improved by a
√
H factor).
Theorem 4 (Nash-VI with Bernstein bonus). For any p ∈ (0, 1], letting ι = log(SABT/p), then with
probability at least 1− p, Algorithm 1 with Bernstein type bonus (3) (with some absolute c > 0) achieves:
• (V †,ν
out
1 − V µ
out,†
1 )(s1) ≤ ǫ, if the number of episodes K ≥ Ω(H3SABι/ǫ2 +H3S2ABι2/ǫ).
• Regret(K) =
∑K
k=1(V
†,νk
1 − V µ
k,†
1 )(s1) ≤ O(
√
H2SABTι+H3S2ABι2).
Compared with the information-theoretic sample complexity lower bound Ω(H3S(A + B)ι/ǫ2) and
regret lower bound Ω(
√
H2S(A+B)T ) [2], when ǫ is small, Nash-VI with Bernstein bonus achieves
optimal dependency on all of H,S, ǫ up to logarithmic factors in both the sample complexity and the regret,
and the only gap that remains open is a AB/(A+B) ≤ min {A,B} factor. The proof of Theorem 4 can be
found in Appendix C.2.
Comparison with model-free approaches. Different from our model-based approach, a recently pro-
posed model-free algorithm Nash V-Learning [3] achieves sample complexity O˜(H6S(A+B)ι/ǫ2), which
has a tight (A + B) dependency on A,B. However, our Nash-VI has the following important advantages
over Nash V-Learning: 1. Our sample complexity has a better dependency on horizon H; 2. Our algorithm
outputs a single pair of Markov policy (µout, νout) while their algorithm outputs a generic history-dependent
policy that can be only written as a nested mixture of Markov policies; 3. The model-free algorithms in Bai
et al. [3] can not be directly modified to obtain a
√
T -regret (so that the exploration policies can be arbitrarily
poor), while our model-based algorithm has the
√
T -regret guarantee.
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Algorithm 2 Optimistic Value Iteration with Zero Reward (VI-Zero)
Require: Bonus βt.
1: Initialize: for any (s, a, b, h), V˜h(s, a, b)← H ,∆← H , Nh(s, a, b)← 0.
2: for episode k = 1, . . . ,K do
3: for step h = H,H − 1, . . . , 1 do
4: for (s, a, b) ∈ S ×A× B do
5: t← Nh(s, a, b).
6: if t > 0 then
7: Q˜h(s, a, b)← min{(P̂hV˜h+1)(s, a, b) + βt,H}.
8: for s ∈ S do
9: πh(s)← argmax(a,b)∈A×B Q˜h(s, a, b).
10: V˜h(s)← (DπhQ˜h)(s).
11: if V˜1(s1) < ∆ then
12: ∆← V˜1(s1) and P̂out ← P̂.
13: for step h = 1, . . . ,H do
14: take action (ah, bh) ∼ πh(·, ·|sh), observe next state sh+1.
15: add 1 to Nh(sh, ah, bh) and Nh(sh, ah, bh, sh+1).
16: P̂h(·|sh, ah, bh)← Nh(sh, ah, bh, ·)/Nh(sh, ah, bh).
17: Output P̂out.
4 Reward-free Learning
In this section, we modify our model-based algorithm Nash-VI into the reward-free exploration setting [18],
which is also known as the task-agnostic [40] or reward-agnostic setting. Reward-free learning has two
phases: In the exploration phase, the agent first collects trajectories from a Markov gameM without a pre-
specified reward function. After the exploration, in the planning phase, the agent is tasked with computing
near-optimal policies underM for a collection of given reward functions.
There are strong practical motivations for considering the reward-free setting. First, in applications
such as robotics, we face multiple tasks in sequential systems with shared transition dynamics (i.e. the
world) but very different rewards. There, we prefer to learn the underlying transition independent of reward
information. Second, from the algorithm design perspective, decoupling exploration and planning (i.e.
performing exploration without reward information) can be valuable for designing new algorithms in more
challenging settings (e.g. with function approximation).
4.1 Algorithm description
We now describe our algorithm for reward-free learning in zero-sum Markov games.
Exploration phase. In the first phase of reward-free learning, we deploy algorithm Optimistic Value It-
eration with Zero Reward (VI-Zero, Algorithm 2). This algorithm differs from the reward-aware Nash-
VI (Algorithm 1) in two important aspects. First, we use zero reward in the exploration phase (Line 7), and
only maintains an upper bound of the (reward-free) value function instead of both upper and lower bounds.
Second, our exploration policy is the maximizing (instead of CCE) policy of the value function (Line 9).
We remark that the Q˜h(s, a, b) maintained in the algorithm 2 is no longer an upper bound for any actual
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value function (as it has no reward), but rather a measure of uncertainty or suboptimality that the agent may
suffer—if she takes action (a, b) at state s and step h, and makes decisions by utilizing the empirical esti-
mate P̂ in the remaining steps (see a rigorous version of this statement in Lemma 25). Finally, the empirical
transition P̂ of the episode that minimizes V˜1(s1) is outputted and passed to the planning phase.
Planning phase. After obtaining the estimate of tranisiton P̂, our planning algorithm is rather simple.
For any given reward r, we compute the Nash equilibrium of the Markov game M(P̂, r) with estimated
transition P̂ and reward r. Since both P̂ and r are known exactly, this is a pure computation problem without
any sampling error and can be efficiently solved by simple planning algorithms such as the vanilla Nash
value iteration without optimism (see Appendix D.2 for more details).
4.2 Theoretical guarantees
Now we are ready to state our theoretical guarantees for reward-free learning. It claims that the empirical
transition P̂out outputted by VI-Zero is close to the true transition P, in the sense that any Nash equilibrium
of theM(P̂, r) is also an approximate Nash equilibrium of the true underlying Markov gameM(P, r).
Theorem 5 (Sample complexity of VI-Zero). There exists an absolute constant c, for any p ∈ (0, 1], ǫ ∈
(0,H], N ∈ N, if we choose bonus βt = c(
√
H2ι/t + H2Sι/t) with ι = log(NSABT/p) and K ≥
c(H4SABι/ǫ2 + H3S2ABι2/ǫ), then with probability at least 1 − p, the output P̂out of Algorithm 2 has
the following property: for any N fixed reward functions r1, . . . , rN , a Nash equilibrium of Markov game
M(P̂out, ri) is also an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of the true Markov gameM(P, ri) for all i ∈ [N ].
Remark 6. Despite Theorem 5 requires reward functions r1, . . . , rN to be given, our analysis directly
extends to the setting where rewards are also unknown and stochastic, but all N stochastic rewards can
be collected simultaneously through bandit feedback in the exploration phase. There, we can simply use
the average of the collected rewards of each task as an estimator for each reward function. We can obtain
a similar guarantee as Theorem 5 with the same sample complexity, up to some absolute constant, since
learning transition is more challenging than learning the reward.
Theorem 5 shows that, when ǫ is small, VI-Zero only needs O˜(H4SAB/ǫ2) samples to learn an estimate
of the transition P̂out, which is accurate enough to learn the approximate Nash equilibrium for any N fixed
rewards. The most important advantage of reward-free learning comes from the sample complexity only
scales polylogarithmically with respect to the number of tasks or reward functions N . This is in sharp
contrast to the reward-aware algorithms (e.g. Nash-VI), where the algorithm has to be rerunned for each
different task, and the total sample complexity must scale linearly in N . In exchange for this benefit,
compared to Nash-VI, VI-Zero loses a factor of H in the leading term of sample complexity since we can
not use Bernstein bonus any more due to the lack of reward information. VI-Zero also does not have regret
guarantee, since again without reward information, the exploration policies are naturally sub-optimal. The
proof of Theorem 5 can be found in Appendix D.1.
Connections with reward-free learning in MDPs. Since MDPs is a special case of Markov games, our
algorithm VI-Zero directly applies to the single-agent setting, and yields a sample complexity similar to
existing results [40, 35]. However, distinct from existing results which require both exploration algorithm
and planning algorithm to be specially designed to work together, our algorithm allows arbitrary planning
algorithm as long as it computes the Nash equilibrium of a Markov game with known transition and reward.
Therefore, our results completely decouple the exploration and the planning.
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Lower bound for reward-free learning. Finally, we comment that despite the sample complexity in
Theorem 5 scales as AB instead of A + B, our next theorem states that unlike the general reward-aware
setting, this AB scaling is unavoidable in the reward-free setting. This reveals an intrinsic gap between the
reward-free and reward-aware learning: An A + B dependency is only achievable via sampling schemes
that are reward-aware. A similar lower bound is also presented in recent work [39] for the discounted setting
with a different hard instance construction.
Theorem 7 (Lower bound for reward-free learning of Markov games). There exists an absolute constant c >
0 such that for any ǫ ∈ (0, c], there exists a family of Markov games M(ǫ) satisfying that: for any reward-
free algorithm A using K ≤ cH2SAB/ǫ2 episodes, there exists a Markov gameM∈M(ǫ) such that if we
run A onM and output policies (µˆ, νˆ), then with probability at least 1/3, we have (V †,νˆ1 − V µˆ,†1 )(s1) ≥ ǫ.
This lower bound shows that the sample complexity in Theorem 5 is optimal in S, A,B, and ǫ. The
proof of Theorem 7 can be found in Appendix D.3.
5 Multiplayer General-sum Markov Games
In this section, we extend both our model-based algorithms (Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2) to the setting of
multiplayer general-sum Markov games, and present corresponding theoretical guarantees.
5.1 Problem formulation
A general-sum Markov game (general-sum MG) withm players is a tupleMG(H,S, {Ai}mi=1,P, {ri}mi=1),
where H , S denote the length of each episode and the state space. Different from the two-player zero-sum
setting, we now havem different action spaces, whereAi is the action space for the ith player and |Ai| = Ai.
We let a := (a1, · · · , am) denote the (tuple of) joint actions by allm players. P = {Ph}h∈[H] is a collection
of transition matrices, so that Ph(·|s,a) gives the distribution of the next state if actions a are taken at state
s at step h, and ri = {rh,i}h∈[H] is a collection of reward functions for ith player, so that rh,i(s,a) gives the
reward received by the ith player if actions a are taken at state s at step h.
In this section, we consider three versions of equlibrium for general-sum MGs: Nash equilibrium (NE),
correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE), all being standard solution notions
in games [24]. These three notions coincide on two-player zero-sum games, but are not equivalent to each
other on multi-player general-sum games; any one of them could be desired depending on the application at
hand. Below we introduce their definitions.
(Approximate) Nash equilibrium in general-sum MG. The policy of the ith player is denoted as πi :={
πh,i : S → ∆Ai
}
h∈[H]
. We denote the product policy of all the players as π := π1×· · ·×πM , and denote
the policy of the all the players except the ith player as π−i. We define V
π
h,i(s) as the expected cumulative
reward that will be received by the ith player if starting at state s at step h and all players follow policy π.
For any strategy π−i, there also exists a best response of the i
th player, which is a policy µ†(π−i) satisfying
V
µ†(π−i),π−i
h,i (s) = supπi V
πi,π−i
h,i (s) for any (s, h) ∈ S × [H]. We denote V
†,π−i
h,i
:= V
µ†(π−i),π−i
h,i . The
Q-functions of the best response can be defined similarly.
Our first objective is to find an approximate Nash equilibrium of Markov games.
Definition 8 (ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium in general-sumMG). A product policy π is an ǫ-approximate
Nash equilibrium if maxi∈[m] (V
†,π−i
1,i − V π1,i)(s1) ≤ ǫ.
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The above definition requires the suboptimality gap (V
†,π−i
1,i − V π1,i)(s1) to be less than ǫ for all player
i. This is consistent with the two-player case (Definition 1) up to a constant of 2, since in the two-player
zero-sum setting, we have V π1,1(s1) = −V π1,2(s1) for any product policy π = (µ, ν), and therefore (V †,ν1,1 −
V µ,†1,1 )(s1) ≤ 2maxi∈[2] (V †,π−i1,i − V π1,i)(s1) ≤ 2(V †,ν1,1 − V µ,†1,1 )(s1).We can similarly define the regret.
Definition 9 (Nash-regret in general-sum MG). Let πk denote the (product) policy deployed by the algo-
rithm in the kth episode. After a total of K episodes, the regret is defined as
RegretNash(K) =
K∑
k=1
max
i∈[m]
(V
†,πk−i
1,i − V π
k
1,i )(s1).
(Approximate) CCE in general-sum MG. The coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) is a relaxed version
of Nash equilibrium in which we consider general correlated policies instead of product policies. Let A =
A1 × · · · × Am denote the joint action space.
Definition 10 (CCE in in general-sum MG). A (correlated) policy π := {πh(s) ∈ ∆A : (h, s) ∈ [H]× S}
is a CCE if maxi∈[m] V
†,π−i
h,i (s) ≤ V πh,i(s) for all (s, h) ∈ S × [H].
Compared with a Nash equilibrium, a CEE is not necessarily a product policy, that is, we may not have
πh(s) ∈ ∆A1 × · · · ×∆Am . Similarly, we also define ǫ-approximate CCE and CCE-regret below.
Definition 11 (ǫ-approximate CCE in general-sum MG). A policy π := {πh(s) ∈ ∆A : (h, s) ∈ [H]×S}
is an ǫ-approximate CCE if maxi∈[m] (V
†,π−i
1,i − V π1,i)(s1) ≤ ǫ.
Definition 12 (CCE-regret in general-sum MG). Let policy πk denote the (correlated) policy deployed by
the algorithm in the kth episode. After a total ofK episodes, the regret is defined as
RegretCCE(K) =
K∑
k=1
max
i∈[m]
(V
†,πk−i
1,i − V π
k
1,i )(s1).
(Approximate) CE in general-sum MG. The correlated equilibrium (CE) is another relaxation of the
Nash equilibrium. To define CE, we first introduce the concept of strategy modification: A strategy modifi-
cation φ := {φh,s(a) ∈ Ai : (h, s, a) ∈ [H] × S × Ai} for player i is a set of S ×H injective functions
from Ai to itself. Let Φi denote the set of all possible strategy modifications for player i.
One can compose a strategy modification φ with any Markov policy π and obtain a new policy φ ◦ π
such that when policy π chooses to play a := (a1, . . . , am) at state s and step h, policy φ ◦ πwill play
(a1, . . . , ai−1, φh,s(ai), ai+1, . . . , am) instead.
Definition 13 (CE in general-sum MG). A policy π := {πh(s) ∈ ∆A : (h, s) ∈ [H] × S} is a CE if
maxi∈[m]maxφ∈Φi V
φ◦π
h,i (s) ≤ V πh,i(s) holds for all (s, h) ∈ S × [H].
Similarly, we have an approximate version of CE and CE-regret.
Definition 14 (ǫ-approximate CE in Markov games). A policy π := {πh(s) ∈ ∆A : (h, s) ∈ [H]× S} is
an ǫ-approximate CE if maxi∈[m]maxφ∈Φi(V
φ◦π
1,i − V π1,i)(s1) ≤ ǫ.
Definition 15 (CE-regret in multiplayer Markov games). Let product policy πk denote the policy deployed
by the algorithm in the kth episode. After a total of K episodes, the regret is defined as
RegretCE(K) =
K∑
k=1
max
i∈[m]
max
φ
( V φ◦π
k
1,i − V π
k
1,i )(s1).
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Algorithm 3Multiplayer Optimistic Nash Value Iteration (Multi-Nash-VI)
1: Initialize: for any (s,a, h, i), Qh,i(s,a)← H , Qh,i(s,a)← 0, ∆← H , Nh(s,a)← 0.
2: for episode k = 1, . . . ,K do
3: for step h = H,H − 1, . . . , 1 do
4: for (s,a) ∈ S ×A1 × · · · × Am do
5: t← Nh(s,a);
6: if t > 0 then
7: for player i = 1, 2, . . . ,m do
8: Qh,i(s,a)← min{(rh,i + P̂hV h+1,i)(s,a) + βt,H}.
9: Q
h,i
(s,a)← max{(rh,i + P̂hV h+1,i)(s,a)− βt, 0}.
10: for s ∈ S do
11: πh(·|s)← EQUILIBRIUM(Qh,1(s, ·), Qh,2(s, ·), · · · , Qh,M(s, ·)).
12: for player i = 1, 2, . . . ,m do
13: V h,i(s)← (DπhQh,i)(s); V h,i(s)← (DπhQh,i)(s).
14: if maxi∈[m](V 1,i − V 1,i)(s1) < ∆ then
15: ∆← maxi∈[m](V 1,i − V 1,i)(s1) and πout ← π.
16: for step h = 1, . . . ,H do
17: take action ah ∼ πh(·|sh), observe reward rh and next state sh+1.
18: add 1 to Nh(sh,ah) and Nh(sh,ah, sh+1).
19: P̂h(·|sh,ah)← Nh(sh,ah, ·)/Nh(sh,ah).
20: Output πout.
Relationship between Nash, CE, and CCE. For general-sum MGs, we have {Nash} ⊆ {CE} ⊆
{CCE}, so that they form a nested set of notions of equilibria [24]. Indeed, one can easily verify that if
we restrict the choice of strategy modification φ to those consisting of only constant functions, i.e., φh,s(a)
being independent of a, Definition 13 will reduce to the definition of CCE policy. In addition, any Nash
equilibrium is a CE by definition. Finally, since a Nash equilibrium always exists, so does CE and CCE.
5.2 Multiplayer optimistic Nash value iteration
Here we present the Multi-Nash-VI algorithm, which is an extension of Algorithm 1 for multi-player
general-sum Markov games.
The EQUILIBRIUM Subroutine. Our EQUILIBRIUM subroutine in Line 11 could be taken from either one
of the {NASH,CE,CCE} subroutines for one-step games. When using NASH, we compute the Nash equi-
librium of a one-step multi-player game (see, e.g., Berg and Sandholm [5] for an overview of the available
algorithms); the worst-case computational complexity of such a subroutine will be PPAD-hard [9]. When
using CE or CCE, we find CEs or CCEs of the one-step games respectively, which can be solved in polyno-
mial time using linear programming. However, the policies found are not guaranteed to be a product policy.
We remark that in Algorithm 1 we used the CCE subroutine for finding Nash in two-player zero-sum games,
which seemingly contrasts the principle of using the right subroutine for finding the right equilibrium, but
nevertheless works as the Nash equilibrium and CCE are equivalent in zero-sum games.
Now we are ready to present the theoretical guarantees for Algorithm 3. We let πk denote the policy
computed in line 11 of Algorithm 3 in the kth episode.
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Theorem 16 (Multi-Nash-VI). There exists an absolute constant c, for any p ∈ (0, 1], let ι = log(SABT/p),
then with probability at least 1− p, Algorithm 3 with bonus βt = c
√
SH2ι/t and EQUILIBRIUM being one
of {NASH,CE,CCE} satisfies (repsectively):
• πout is an ǫ-approximate {NASH,CE,CCE}, if the number of episodes K ≥ Ω(H4S2(∏mi=1Ai)ι/ǫ2).
• Regret{Nash,CE,CCE}(K) ≤ O(
√
H3S2(
∏m
i=1Ai)T ι).
The proof of Theorem 17 can be found in Appendix E.1. In the situation where the EQUILIBRIUM sub-
routine is taken as NASH, Theorem 16 provides the sample complexity bound of Multi-Nash-VI algorithm to
find a ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium and its regret bound. Compared with our earlier result in two-player
zero-sum games (Theorem 3), here the sample complexity scales as S2H4 instead of SH3. This is because
the auxiliary bonus and Bernstein concentration technique do not apply here. Furthermore, the sample
complexity is proportional to
∏m
i=1Ai, which increases exponentially as the number of players increases.
Runtime of Algorithm 3 We remark that while the Nash guarantee is the strongest among the three
guarantees presented in Theorem 16, the runtime of Algorithm 3 in the Nash case is not guaranteed to be
polynomial and in the worst case PPAD-hard (due to the hardness of the NASH subroutine). In contrast, the
CE and CCE guarantees are weaker, but the corresponding algorithms are guaranteed to finish in polynomial
time.
5.3 Multiplayer reward-free learning
We can also generalize VI-Zero to the multiplayer setting and obtain Algorithm 5, Multi-VI-Zero, which
is almost the same as VI-Zero except that its exploration bonus βt is larger than that of VI-Zero by a
√
S
factor. Please refer to Appendix E.2 for details of Algorithm 5.
Similar to Theorem 5, we have the following theoretical guarantee claiming that any {NASH,CCE,CE}
of M(P̂out, r) is also an approximate {NASH,CCE,CE} of the true Markov gameM(P, r), where P̂out is
the empirical transition outputted by Algorithm 5.
Theorem 17 (Multi-VI-Zero). There exists an absolute constant c, for any p ∈ (0, 1], ǫ ∈ (0,H], N ∈ N,
if we choose bonus βt = c
√
H2Sι/t with ι = log(NSABT/p) and K ≥ c(H4S2(∏mi=1Ai)ι/ǫ2), then
with probability at least 1 − p, the output P̂out of Algorithm 5 has the following property: for any N fixed
reward functions r1, . . . , rN , any {NASH,CCE,CE} of Markov gameM(P̂out, ri) is also an ǫ-approximate
{NASH,CCE,CE} of the true Markov gameM(P, ri) for all i ∈ [N ].
The proof of Theorem 17 can be found in Appendix E.2. It is worth mentioning that the empirical
Markov game M(P̂out, r) may have multiple {Nash equilibria,CCEs,CEs} and Theorem 17 ensures that
all of them are ǫ-approximate {Nash equilibria,CCEs,CEs} of the true Markov game. Also, note that the
sample complexity here is quadratic in the number of states because we are using the exploration bonus
βt =
√
H2Sι/t that is larger than usual by a
√
S factor.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a sharp analysis of model-based algorithms for Markov games. Our new algo-
rithm Nash-VI can find an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum Markov game in O˜(H3SAB/ǫ2)
episodes of game playing, which almost matches the sample complexity lower bound except for the AB vs.
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A+ B dependency. We also applied our analysis to derive new efficient algorithms for task-agnostic game
playing, as well as the first line of multi-player general-sum Markov games. There are a number of com-
pelling future directions to this work. For example, can we achieve A+B instead of AB sample complexity
for zero-sum games using model-based approaches (thus closing the gap between lower and upper bounds)?
How to design more efficient algorithms for general-sum games with better sample complexity (e.g., O(S)
instead of O(S2))? We would like to leave these as future work.
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A Bellman Equations for Markov Games
In this section, we present the Bellman equations for different types of values in Markov games.
Fixed policies. For any pair of Markov policy (µ, ν), by definition of their values in (1) (2), we have the
following Bellman equations:
Qµ,νh (s, a, b) = (rh + PhV
µ,ν
h+1)(s, a, b), V
µ,ν
h (s) = (Dµh×νhQ
µ,ν
h )(s)
for all (s, a, b, h) ∈ S ×A× B × [H], where V µ,νH+1(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S .
Best responses. For any Markov policy µ of the max-player, by definition, we have the following Bellman
equations for values of its best response:
Qµ,†h (s, a, b) = (rh + PhV
µ,†
h+1)(s, a, b), V
µ,†
h (s) = inf
ν∈∆B
(Dµh×νQ
µ,†
h )(s),
for all (s, a, b, h) ∈ S ×A× B × [H], where V µ,†H+1(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S .
Similarly, for any Markov policy ν of the min-player, we also have the following symmetric version of
Bellman equations for values of its best response:
Q†,νh (s, a, b) = (rh + PhV
†,ν
h+1)(s, a, b), V
†,ν
h (s) = sup
µ∈∆A
(Dµ×νhQ
†,ν
h )(s).
for all (s, a, b, h) ∈ S ×A× B × [H], where V †,νH+1(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S .
Nash equilibria. Finally, by definition of Nash equilibria in Markov games, we have the following Bell-
man optimality equations:
Q⋆h(s, a, b) =(rh + PhV
⋆
h+1)(s, a, b)
V ⋆h (s) = sup
µ∈∆A
inf
ν∈∆B
(Dµ×νQ
⋆
h)(s) = inf
ν∈∆B
sup
µ∈∆A
(Dµ×νQ
⋆
h)(s).
for all (s, a, b, h) ∈ S ×A× B × [H], where V ⋆H+1(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S .
B Properties of Coarse Correlated Equilibrium
Recall the definition for CCE in our main paper (4), we restate it here after rescaling. For any pair of matrices
P,Q ∈ [0, 1]n×m, the subroutine CCE(P,Q) returns a distribution π ∈ ∆n×m that satisfies:
E(a,b)∼πP (a, b) ≥max
a⋆
E(a,b)∼πP (a
⋆, b) (5)
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b) ≤min
b⋆
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b
⋆)
Wemake three remarks on CCE. First, a CCE always exists since a Nash equilibrium for a general-sum game
with payoff matrices (P,Q) is also a CCE defined by (P,Q), and a Nash equilibrium always exists. Second,
a CCE can be efficiently computed, since above constraints (5) for CCE can be rewritten as n + m linear
constraints on π ∈ ∆n×m, which can be efficiently resolved by standard linear programming algorithm.
Third, a CCE in general-sum games needs not to be a Nash equilibrium. However, a CCE in zero-sum
games is guaranteed to be a Nash equalibrium.
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Proposition 18. Let π = CCE(Q,Q), and (µ, ν) be the marginal distribution over both players’ actions
induced by π. Then (µ, ν) is a Nash equilibrium for payoff matrix Q.
Proof of Proposition 18. Let N⋆ be the value of Nash equilibrium for Q. Since π = CCE(Q,Q), by
definition, we have:
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b) ≥max
a⋆
E(a,b)∼πQ(a
⋆, b) = max
a⋆
Eb∼νQ(a
⋆, b) ≥ N⋆
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b) ≤min
b⋆
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b
⋆) = min
b⋆
Ea∼µQ(a, b
⋆) ≤ N⋆
This gives:
max
a⋆
Eb∼νQ(a
⋆, b) = min
b⋆
Ea∼µQ(a, b
⋆) = N⋆
which finishes the proof.
Intuitively, a CCE procedure can be used in Nash Q-learning for finding an approximate Nash equilib-
rium, because the values of upper confidence and lower confidence (Q andQ) will be eventually very close,
so that the preconditions of Proposition 18 becomes approximately satisfied.
C Proof for Section 3 – Optimistic Nash Value Iteration
C.1 Proof of Theorem 3
We denote V k,Qk, πk, µk and νk 4 for values and policies at the beginning of the k-th episode. In particular,
Nkh (s, a, b) is the number we have visited the state-action tuple (s, a, b) at the h-th step before the k-th
episode. Nkh (s, a, b, s
′) is defined by the same token. Using this notation, we can further define the empirical
transition by P̂kh(s
′|s, a, b) := Nkh (s, a, b, s′)/Nkh (s, a, b).
As a result, the bonus terms can be written as
βkh(s, a, b) := C
(√
ιH2
Nkh (s, a, b)
+
H2Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
)
(6)
γkh(s, a, b) :=
C
H
P̂h(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(s, a, b) (7)
for some absolute constant C > 0.
We begin with an auxiliary lemma bounding the lower-order term.
Lemma 19. For any V s.t. |V |(s) ≤ (V kh+1 − V kh+1)(s) for any s, with probability 1− p,
|(P̂kh − Ph)V (s, a, b)|
≤O
(
1
H
min{P̂kh(V kh+1 − V kh+1)(s, a, b),Ph(V kh+1 − V kh+1)(s, a, b)} +
H2Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
)
.
4recall that (µkh, ν
k
h) are the marginal distributions of pi
k
h.
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Proof. By triangle inequality,
|(P̂kh − Ph)V (s, a, b)| ≤
∑
s′
|(P̂kh − Ph)(s′|s, a, b)||V |(s′)
≤
∑
s′
|(P̂kh − Ph)(s′|s, a, b)|(V kh+1 − V kh+1)(s′)
(i)
≤O
∑
s′
(
√
ιP̂kh(s
′|s, a, b)
Nkh (s, a, b)
+
ι
Nkh (s, a, b)
)(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(s′)

(ii)
≤O
(∑
s′
(
P̂
k
h(s
′|s, a, b)
H
+
Hι
Nkh (s, a, b)
)(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(s′)
)
≤O
(
P̂
k
h(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(s, a, b)
H
+
H2Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
)
,
where (i) is by empirical Bernstein bound [23] and (ii) is by AM-GM inequality. This proves the empirical
version. Use the standard Bernstein bound, we get the a similar upper bound. Combining the two bounds
completes the proof.
Now we can prove the upper and lower bounds are indeed upper and lower bounds of the best reponses.
Lemma 20. With probability 1− p, for all h, s, a, b and k ∈ [K], we haveQ
k
h(s, a, b) ≥ Q†,ν
k
h (s, a, b) ≥ Qµ
k ,†
h (s, a, b) ≥ Qkh(s, a, b),
V
k
h(s) ≥ V †,ν
k
h (s) ≥ V µ
k ,†
h (s) ≥ V kh(s).
(8)
Proof. Again, the proof is by backward induction. Suppose the bounds hold for the Q-values in the h+1-th
step, we now establish the bounds for the values in the h+ 1-th step and Q-values in the h-step. Consider a
fixed state s,
V
k
h+1(s) = Dπk
h
Q
k
h+1(s)
≥ max
µ
Dµ×νkh+1
Q
k
h+1(s)
≥ max
µ
Dµ×νkh+1
Q†,ν
k
h+1(s) = V
†,νk
h+1 (s).
(9)
Similarly, we can show V kh+1(s) ≤ V µ
k ,†
h+1 (s).
Now consider a fixed triple (s, a, b) at h-th step. We have
(Q
k
h −Q†,ν
k
h )(s, a, b)
=(P̂khV
k
h+1 − PhV †,ν
k
h+1 + β
k
h + γ
k
h)(s, a, b)
=(P̂kh − Ph)(V †,ν
k
h+1 − V ⋆h+1)(s, a, b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+ (P̂kh − Ph)V ⋆h+1(s, a, b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+ (βkh + γ
k
h)(s, a, b).
(10)
21
Using Lemma 19 with V = V †,ν
k
h+1 − V ⋆h+1, which satisfies the condition in Lemma 19 by induction
hypothesis,
|(A)| ≤ O
(
P̂
k
h(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(s, a, b)
H
+
H2Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
)
.
By Hoeffding’s inequality, with high probability,
|(B)| ≤ O
(√
H2ι
Nkh (s, a, b)
+
Hι
Nkh (s, a, b)
)
.
Plugging into (10) and recalling the definition of βkh and γ
k
h, we obtain Q
k
h(s, a, b) ≥ Q†,ν
k
h (s, a, b).
Similarly, we can show Qk
h
(s, a, b) ≤ Qµk ,†h (s, a, b).
Finally we come to the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. We first upper bound the regret. By Lemma 20, the regret can be upper bounded by∑
k
(V †,ν
k
1 (s
k
1)− V µ
k ,†
1 (s
k
1)) ≤
∑
k
(V
k
1(s
k
1)− V k1(sk1)).
For brevity’s sake, we define the following notations:
∆kh := (V
k
h − V kh)(skh),
ζkh := ∆
k
h − (Qkh −Qkh)(s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h),
ξkh := Ph(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(skh, akh, bkh)−∆kh+1.
(11)
It’s easy to check ζkh and ξ
k
h are martingale difference sequences. With a slight abuse of notation, we use β
k
h
to refer to βkh(s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h) and N
k
h to refer to N
k
h (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h) in the proof.
We have
∆kh =Dπk
(
Q
k
h,i −Qkh,i
)(
skh
)
=ζkh +
(
Q
k
h,i −Qkh,i
)(
skh, a
k
h, b
k
h
)
=ζkh + 2β
k
h + 2γ
k
h + P̂
k
h(V
k
h+1 − V
k
h+1)
(
skh, a
k
h, b
k
h
)
(i)
≤ζkh + 2βkh + 2γkh + Ph(V kh+1 − V
k
h+1)
(
skh, a
k
h, b
k
h
)
+O
(
Ph(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(skh, akh, bkh)
H
+
H2Sι
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
)
=ζkh + 2β
k
h + 2γ
k
h + ξ
k
h +∆
k
h+1 +O
(
Ph(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(skh, akh, bkh)
H
+
H2Sι
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
)
(ii)
≤∆kh+1 + ζkh + ξkh +O
(
Ph(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(skh, akh, bkh)
H
+
√
H2ι
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
+
H2Sι
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
)
=
(
1 +
O(1)
H
)
∆kh+1 + ζ
k
h +
(
1 +
O(1)
H
)
ξkh +O
(√
H2ι
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
+
H2Sι
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
)
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where (i) and (ii) both follow from Lemma 19.
Recursing this argument for h ∈ [H] and taking the sum,
K∑
k=1
∆k1 ≤
K∑
k=1
H∑
h=1
O
(
ζkh + ξ
k
h +
√
H2ι(skh, a
k
h, b
k
h)
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
+
H2Sι
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
)
.
By Azuma-Hoeffding inequality,
K∑
k=1
H∑
h=1
ζkh ≤ O
(
H
√
HKι
)
= O
(√
H2T ι
)
,
K∑
k=1
H∑
h=1
ξkh ≤ O
(
H
√
HKι
)
= O
(√
H2T ι
)
.
By pigeon-hole argument,
K∑
k=1
H∑
h=1
1√
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
≤
∑
s,a,b,h
Nkh (s,a,b)∑
n=1
1√
n
≤ O
(√
HSABT
)
,
K∑
k=1
H∑
h=1
1
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
≤
∑
s,a,b,h
Nkh (s,a,b)∑
n=1
1
n
≤ O(HSABι). (12)
Put everything together we get
K∑
k=1
(V †,ν
k
1 (s
k
1)− V µ
k ,†
1 (s
k
1)) ≤ O
(√
H2SABTι+H3S2ABι2
)
To prove the sample complexity, notice by definition of πout, if πout = πk
⋆
, we must have k⋆ =
argmink
(
V
k
1 − V k1
)
(s1). As a result,
(V †,ν
k⋆
1 − V µ
k⋆ ,†
1 )(s1) ≤ (V
k⋆
1 − V k
⋆
1 )(s1) ≤
1
K
O
(√
H2SABTι+H3S2ABι2
)
which concludes the proof.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 4
We use the same notation as in Appendix C.1 except the form of bonus. Besides, we define the empirical
variance operator
V̂
k
hV (s, a, b) := Vars′∼P̂k
h
(·|s,a,b)
V (s′)
and the true (population) variance operator
VhV (s, a, b) := Vars′∼Ph(·|s,a,b)V (s
′)
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for any function V ∈ ∆S .
As a result, the bonus terms can be written as
βkh(s, a, b) := C

√√√√ ιV̂kh[(V kh+1 + V kh+1)/2](s, a, b)
Nkh (s, a, b)
+
H2Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
 (13)
for some absolute constant C > 0.
Since the proof of Lemma 19 does not depend on the form of the bonus, it can also be applied here. As
in Appendix C.1, we will prove the upper and lower bounds are indeed upper and lower bounds of the best
reponses.
Lemma 21. With probability 1− p, for all h, s, a, b and k ∈ [K], we haveQ
k
h(s, a, b) ≥ Q†,ν
k
h (s, a, b) ≥ Qµ
k ,†
h (s, a, b) ≥ Qkh(s, a, b),
V
k
h(s) ≥ V †,ν
k
h (s) ≥ V µ
k ,†
h (s) ≥ V kh(s).
(14)
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 20. The decomposition (10) still holds and (A) is bounded
using Lemma 19 as before. The only difference is that we need to bound (B) more carefully. First notice
by induction assumption,
|[V̂kh(V kh+1 + V kh+1)/2] − V̂khV ⋆h+1|(s, a, b)
≤|[P̂kh(V kh+1 + V kh+1)/2]2 − (P̂khV ⋆h+1)2|(s, a, b) + |P̂kh[(V kh+1 + V kh+1)/2]2 − P̂kh(V ⋆h+1)2|(s, a, b)
≤4HP̂kh|(V kh+1 + V kh+1)/2 − V ⋆h+1|(s, a, b)
≤4HP̂kh(V kh+1 − V kh+1)(s, a, b),
(15)
which implies√√√√ ιV̂khV ⋆h+1(s, a, b)
Nkh (s, a, b)
≤
√√√√ ι[V̂kh[(V kh+1 + V kh+1)/2] + 4HP̂kh(V kh+1 − V kh+1)](s, a, b)
Nkh (s, a, b)
≤
√√√√ ιV̂kh[(V kh+1 + V kh+1)/2](s, a, b)
Nkh (s, a, b)
+
√√√√4ιHP̂kh(V kh+1 − V kh+1)](s, a, b)
Nkh (s, a, b)
(i)
≤
√√√√ ιV̂kh[(V kh+1 + V kh+1)/2](s, a, b)
Nkh (s, a, b)
+
P̂
k
h(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)
H
+
4H2ι
Nkh (s, a, b)
.
(16)
where (i) is by AM-GM inequality.
By Empirical Bernstein bound [23],
|(B)| ≤ O

√√√√ ιV̂khV ⋆h+1(s, a, b)
Nkh (s, a, b)
+
Hι
Nkh (s, a, b)

Plugging the above inequalities into (10) and recalling the definition of βkh and γ
k
h completes the proof.
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We need one more lemma to upper bound the variance:
Lemma 22. Consider a fixed (s, a, b) triple at h-th step. With probability 1− p,
|V̂kh[(V
k
h+1 + V
k
h+1)/2]− VhV π
k
h+1|(s, a, b) ≤ 2HP̂kh(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(s, a, b) + 1 +
4H4Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
.
Proof. Following the same argument in Lemma 21, we have V
k
h(s) ≥ V π
k
h (s) ≥ V kh(s). As a result,
|V̂kh[(V kh+1 + V kh+1)/2]− VhV π
k
h+1|(s, a, b)
=|[P̂kh(V kh+1 + V kh+1)2/4 − Ph(V π
k
h+1)
2](s, a, b) − [(P̂kh(V kh+1 + V kh+1))2/4− (PhV π
k
h+1)
2](s, a, b)|
≤[P̂kh(V kh+1)2 − Ph(V kh+1)2 − (P̂khV kh+1)2 + (PhV kh+1)2](s, a, b)
≤[|(P̂kh − Ph)(V kh+1)2|+ |Ph[(V kh+1)2 − (V kh+1)2]|
+ |(P̂khV kh+1)2 − (PhV kh+1)2|+ |(PhV kh+1)2 − (PhV
k
h+1)
2|](s, a, b)
These terms can be bounded separately by
|(P̂kh − Ph)(V kh+1)2|(s, a, b) ≤ O(H2
√
Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
),
|Ph[(V kh+1)2 − (V kh+1)2]|(s, a, b) ≤ 2H[Ph(V kh+1 − V kh+1)](s, a, b),
|(P̂khV kh+1)2 − (PhV kh+1)2|(s, a, b) ≤ 2H[(P̂kh − Ph)V kh+1](s, a, b) ≤ O(H2
√
Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
),
|(PhV kh+1)2 − (PhV kh+1)2|(s, a, b) ≤ 2H[Ph(V kh+1 − V kh+1)](s, a, b).
Combining withH2
√
Sι
Nkh (s,a,b)
≤ 1 + H4Sι
Nkh (s,a,b)
completes the proof.
Finally we come to the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. We define ∆kh, ζ
k
h abd ξ
k
h as in the proof of Theorem 4. As before we have
∆kh ≤ζkh + 2βkh + 2γkh + ξkh +∆kh+1
+O
(
Ph(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(skh, akh, bkh)
H
+
H2Sι
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
)
.
(17)
Using Lemma 22 we have√√√√ ιV̂kh[(V kh+1 + V kh+1)/2](s, a, b)
Nkh (s, a, b)
≤
√
ιVhV
πk
h+1(s, a, b) + ι
Nkh (s, a, b)
+
√√√√2HιP̂kh(V kh+1 − V kh+1)(s, a, b)
Nkh (s, a, b)
+
2H2
√
Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
≤
√
ιVhV
πk
h+1(s, a, b) + ι
Nkh (s, a, b)
+
P̂
k
h(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(s, a, b)
H
+
10H2
√
Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
.
(18)
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Using Lemma 19 we have Combining (18) with the definition of βkh gives
P̂
k
h(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(s, a, b) ≤
(
1 +
O(1)
H
)
Ph(V
k
h+1 − V kh+1)(s, a, b) +O(
H2Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
).
Plugging back into inequality (17) we have
∆kh ≤
(
1 +
O(1)
H
){
∆kh+1 + ζ
k
h + ξ
k
h
+O
(√
ιVhV
πk
h+1(s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
+
√
ι
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
+
H2Sι
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
)}
.
(19)
Recursing this argument for h ∈ [H] and taking the sum,
K∑
k=1
∆k1 ≤
K∑
k=1
H∑
h=1
O
ζkh + ξkh +
√
ιVhV
πk
h+1(s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
+
√
ι
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
+
H2Sι
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
.
The remaining steps are exactly the same as that in the proof of Theorem 3. The only difference is that
we need to bound the sum of variance term by Cauchy-Schwarz,
K∑
k=1
H∑
h=1
√
VhV
πk
h+1(s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
≤
√√√√ K∑
k=1
H∑
h=1
VhV
πk
h+1(s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h) ·
K∑
k=1
H∑
h=1
1
Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h)
(i)
≤O
(√
(HT +H3ι) ·HSABι
)
=O
(√
H2SABT +
√
H4SABι2
)
,
where (i) is by Law of total variation (for example, Lemma 8 in Azar et al. [1]) and inequality (12).
D Proof for Section 4 – Reward-Free Learning
D.1 Proof of Theorem 5
In this section, we prove Theorem 5 for the single reward function case, i.e., N = 1. The proof for multiple
reward functions (N > 1) simply follows from taking a union bound, that is, replacing the failure probability
p by Np.
Let (µk, νk) be an arbitrary Nash-equilibrium policy of M̂k := (P̂k, r), where P̂k is our empirical
estimate of the transition at the beginning of the k’th episode in Algorithm 2. We use Nkh (s, a, b) to denote
the number we have visited the state-action tuple (s, a, b) at the h-th step before the k’th episode. And the
bonus used in the k’th episode can be written as
βkh(s, a, b) := C
(√
H2ι
Nkh (s, a, b)
+
H2Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
)
, (20)
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where ι = log(SABT/p) and C is some absolute constant.
We use Q̂k and V̂ k to denote the empirical optimal value functions of M̂k as following.Q̂
k
h(s, a, b) = (P̂
k
hV̂h+1)(s, a, b) + rh(s, a, b),
V̂ kh (s) = max
µ
min
ν
Dµ×νQ̂
k
h(s).
(21)
Since (µk, νk) is a Nash-equilibrium policy of M̂k, we also have V̂ kh (s) = Dµk×νkQ̂kh(s).
We begin with stating a useful property of matrix game that will be frequently used in our analysis.
Since its proof is quite simple, we omit it here.
Lemma 23. Let X,Y,Z ∈ RA×B and ∆d be the d-dimensional simplex. Suppose |X−Y| ≤ Z, where
the inequality is entry-wise. Then∣∣∣∣maxµ∈△A minν∈△B µ⊤Xν − maxµ∈△A minν∈△B µ⊤Yν
∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxi,j Zij . (22)
The following lemma states that the empirical optimal value functions are close to the true optimal ones,
and their difference is controlled by the exploration value functions calculated in Algorithm 2.
Lemma 24. With probability 1− p, for all h, s, a, b and k ∈ [K], we have,
∣∣∣Q̂kh(s, a, b)−Q⋆h(s, a, b)∣∣∣ ≤ Q˜kh(s, a, b),∣∣∣V̂ kh (s)− V ⋆h (s)∣∣∣ ≤ V˜ kh (s). (23)
Proof. Let’s prove by doing backward induction on h. The case of h = H + 1 holds trivially.
Assume the conclusion hold for (h+ 1)’th step. For h’th step,∣∣∣Q̂kh(s, a, b)−Q⋆h(s, a, b)∣∣∣
≤ min
{∣∣∣[(P̂kh − Ph)V ⋆h+1](s, a, b)∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣[P̂kh(V̂ kh+1 − V ⋆h+1)](s, a, b)∣∣∣ ,H}
(i)
≤ min
{
βkh(s, a, b) + (P̂
k
hV˜
k
h+1)(s, a, b),H
}
(ii)
= Q˜kh(s, a, b),
(24)
where (i) follows from the induction hypothesis and Azuma-Hoeffding inequality, and (ii) follows from the
definition of Q˜kh. By Lemma 23, we immediately obtain |V̂ kh (s)− V ⋆h (s)| ≤ V˜ kh (s).
Now, we are ready to establish the key lemma in our analysis using Lemma 24.
Lemma 25. With probability 1− p, for all h, s, a, b and k ∈ [K], we have|Q̂
k
h(s, a, b)−Q†,ν
k
h (s, a, b)| ≤ αhQ˜kh(s, a, b),
|V̂ kh (s)− V †,ν
k
h (s)| ≤ αhV˜ kh (s),
(25)
and |Q̂kh(s, a, b) −Q
µk ,†
h (s, a, b)| ≤ αhQ˜kh(s, a, b),
|V̂ kh (s)− V µ
k ,†
h (s)| ≤ αhV˜ kh (s),
(26)
where αH+1 = 0 and αh = [(1 +
1
H
)αh+1 +
1
H
] ≤ 4.
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Proof. We only prove the first set of inequalities. The second one follows exactly the same. Again, the
proof is by performing backward induction on h. It is trivial to see the conclusion holds for (H +1)’th step
with αH+1 = 0. Now, assume the conclusion holds for (h+ 1)’th step. For h’th step,
|Q̂kh(s, a, b) −Q†,ν
k
h (s, a, b)|
≤|[(P̂kh − Ph)(V †,ν
k
h+1 − V ⋆h+1)](s, a, b)| + |(P̂kh − Ph)V ⋆h+1(s, a, b)| + |[P̂h(V̂ kh+1 − V †,ν
k
h+1 )](s, a, b)|
≤ |[(P̂kh − Ph)(V †,ν
k
h+1 − V ⋆h+1)](s, a, b)|︸ ︷︷ ︸
(T1)
+
√
H2ι
Nkh (s, a, b)
+ |[P̂h(V̂ kh+1 − V †,ν
k
h+1 )](s, a, b)|︸ ︷︷ ︸
(T2)
,
(27)
where the second inequality follows from Azuma-Hoeffding’s inequality.
We can control the term (T1) by combining Lemma 24 and the induction hypothesis to bound |V †,ν
k
h+1 −
V ⋆h+1|, and then applying the empirical Bernstein inequality [23]:
(T1) ≤
∑
s′
|P̂kh(s′ | s, a, b)− Ph(s′ | s, a, b)||V †,ν
k
h+1 − V ⋆h+1(s′)|
≤
∑
s′
|P̂kh(s′ | s, a, b)− Ph(s′ | s, a, b)|
(
|V †,νkh+1 − V̂ kh+1(s′)|+ |V̂ kh+1 − V ⋆h+1(s′)|
)
≤
∑
s′
|P̂kh(s′ | s, a, b)− Ph(s′ | s, a, b)|(αh+1 + 1)V˜ kh+1
≤(αh+1 + 1)
H
(P̂khV˜
k
h+1)(s, a, b) +
(αh+1 + 1)H
2Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
.
(28)
The term (T2) is bounded by directly applying the induction hypothesis
|[P̂h(V̂ kh+1 − V †,ν
k
h+1 )](s, a, b)| ≤ αh+1[P̂hV˜ kh+1](s, a, b). (29)
Plugging (28) and (29) into (27), we obtain∣∣∣Q̂kh(s, a, b)−Q†,νkh (s, a, b)∣∣∣
≤min
{(
(1 +
1
H
)αh+1 +
1
H
)
[P̂khV˜
k
h+1](s, a, b) +
√
H2ι
Nkh (s, a, b)
+
(αh+1 + 1)H
2Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
,H
}
(i)
≤min
{(
(1 +
1
H
)αh+1 +
1
H
)
[P̂khV˜
k
h+1](s, a, b) + β
k
h(s, a, b),H
}
(ii)
≤
(
(1 +
1
H
)αh+1 +
1
H
)
Q˜kh(s, a, b),
(30)
where (i) follows from the definition of βkh , and (ii) follows from the definition of Q˜
k
h. Therefore, by (30),
choosing αh = [(1 +
1
H
)αh+1 +
1
H
] suffices for the purpose of induction.
Now, let’s prove the inequality for V functions.
|(V̂ kh − V †,ν
k
h )(s)|
(i)
= | max
µ∈△A
(Dµ,νkQ̂
k
h)(s)− max
µ∈△A
(Dµ,νkQ
†,νk
h )(s)|
(ii)
≤ max
a,b
[
αhQ˜
k
h(s, a, b)
]
= αhV˜
k
h (s),
(31)
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where (i) follows from the definition of V̂ kh and V
†,νk
h , and (ii) uses (30) and Lemma 23.
Theorem 26 (Guarantee for UCB-VI from Azar et al. [1]). For any p ∈ (0, 1], choose the exploration bonus
βt in Algrothm 2 as (20). Then, with probability at least 1− p,
K∑
k=1
V˜ k1 (s1) ≤ O(
√
H4SAKι+H3S2Aι2).
Proof of Theorem 5. Recall that out = argmink∈[K] V˜
k
h (s). By Lemma 25 and Theorem 26,
V †,ν
out
h (s)− V µ
out,†
h (s) ≤|V †,ν
out
h (s)− V̂ outh (s)|+ |V̂ outh (s)− V µ
out,†
h (s)|
≤8V˜ outh (s) ≤ O(
√
H4SAι
K
+
H3S2Aι2
K
),
(32)
which completes the proof.
D.2 Vanilla Nash Value Iteration
Here, we provide one optional algorithm, Vanilla Nash VI, for computing the Nash equilibrium policy for a
known model. Its only difference from the value iteration algorithm for MDPs is that the maximum operator
is replaced by the minimax operator in Line 7. We remark that the Nash equilibrium for a two-player
zero-sum game can be computed in polynomial time.
Algorithm 4 Vanilla Nash Value Iteration
1: Input: model M̂ = (P̂, r).
2: Initialize: for all (s, a, b), VH+1(s, a, b)← 0.
3: for step h = H,H − 1, . . . , 1 do
4: for (s, a, b) ∈ S ×A× B do
5: Qh(s, a, b)← [P̂hVh+1](s, a, b) + rh(s, a, b).
6: for s ∈ S do
7: (µˆh(· | s), νˆh(· | s))← NASH-ZERO-SUM(Qh(s, ·, ·)).
8: Vh(s)← µˆh(· | s)⊤Qh(s, ·, ·)νˆh(· | s).
9: Output (µˆ, νˆ)← {(µˆh(· | s), νˆh(· | s))}(h,s)∈[H]×S .
By recalling the definition of best responses in Appendix A, one can directly see that the output policy
(µˆ, νˆ) is a Nash equilibrium for M̂.
D.3 Proof of Theorem 7
In this section, we will prove a Θ(AB/ǫ2) lower bound for reward-free matrix games, i.e., S = H = 1, and
then briefly sketch how to generalize it to Θ(SABH2/ǫ2) for the Markov games setting.
In the matrix game, let the max-player pick row and the min-player pick column. We consider the
following family of Bernoulli matrix games:
M(ǫ) =
{
M ∈ RA×B withMab = 1
2
+ (1− 2 · 1{a 6= a⋆&b = b⋆})ǫ : (a⋆, b⋆) ∈ [A]× [B]
}
, (33)
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where in matrix gameM, the reward is sampled from Ber(Mab) if the max-player picks the a’th row and
the min-player picks the b’th column.
Min-player
Max-player
action 1 . . . b⋆ − 1 b⋆ b⋆ + 1 . . . B
1 + . . . + − + . . . +
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
a⋆ − 1 + . . . + − + . . . +
a⋆ + . . . + + + . . . +
a⋆ + 1 + . . . + − + . . . +
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
A + . . . + − + . . . +
(34)
Above, we visualize the hard instance by using + and − to represent 1/2 + ǫ and 1/2− ǫ, respectively.
It is direct to see that the optimal policy for the max-player is always picking the a⋆’th row and the optimal
policy for the min-player is always picking the b⋆’th column. If the max-player picks the a⋆’th row with
probability smaller than 2/3, it is at least ǫ/10 suboptimal.
Lemma 27. For any fixed matrix gameM from M(ǫ) and N ∈ N, if an algorithm A can output a policy
that is at most ǫ/10 suboptimal with probability at least p using at most N samples, then there exists an
algorithm Aˆ that can identify the best row inM with probability at least p using at most N samples.
Proof. We simply define Aˆ as running algorithm A and choosing the most played row by its outputted
policy as the guess for the best row. By simple calculation, one can show Aˆ will output the best row inM
with probability at least p.
Lemma 27 directly implies that in order to prove the desired lower bound for matrix games:
Claim 28. for any algorithm A using at most N = AB/(103ǫ2) samples, there exists a matrix game M
in M(ǫ) such that when running A on M, it will output a policy that is at least ǫ/10 suboptimal for the
max-player with probability at least 1/4,
it suffices to prove the following claim:
Claim 29. for any algorithm Aˆ using at most N = AB/(103ǫ2) samples, there exists a matrix gameM in
M(ǫ) such that when running Aˆ onM, it will fail to identify the optimal row with probability at least 1/4.
Proof of Claim 29. WLOG, we assume Aˆ is deterministic. Since this is the reward-free setting, being de-
terministic means that algorithm Aˆ will always pull each arm (a, b) for some fixed n(a, b) times and then
output a guess for a⋆ which is a function of the reward revealed.
Denote by L the reward revealed after algorithm Aˆ’s pulling. Denote by P⋆ the probability induced by
pickingM uniformly at random from M(ǫ) and running Aˆ onM. Denote by Pa,b the probability induced
by running Aˆ on M, whose indices of the special row and the special column are a and b, respectively.
Denote by P0,b the probability induced by running A onM, whose b’th column are all 1/2 − ǫ and other
columns are all 1/2 + ǫ. We want to mention that theM we use to define P0,b does not belong toM(ǫ).
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We have
P⋆(Aˆ(L) 6= a⋆) ≥ 1
AB
∑
a,b
P0,b(Aˆ(L) 6= a)− 1
AB
∑
a,b
‖Pa,b − P0,b‖1
≥ 1− 1
A
− 1
AB
∑
a,b
√
2KL(P0,b‖Pa,b)
= 1− 1
A
− 1
AB
∑
a,b
√
2n(a, b)[(
1
2
− ǫ) log
1
2 − ǫ
1
2 + ǫ
+ (
1
2
+ ǫ) log
1
2 + ǫ
1
2 − ǫ
]
≥ 1− 1
A
− 10
AB
∑
a,b
√
n(a, b)ǫ2
≥ 1− 1
A
−
√
100Nǫ2
AB
.
. (35)
Choosing N = AB/(103ǫ2) concludes the proof.
Generalization toMarkov games. Nowwe have aΘ(AB/ǫ2) lower bound for reward-free matrix games.
We can easily generalize it to theMarkov games setting by mimicking the construction in Dann and Brunskill
[7]. We briefly sketch the construction below.
• States, actions and rewards: we consider a finite-horizon MDP withH steps. There is a fixed initial
state in the first step, S states in the second step, and 2 states (one good state and one bad state) for
the remaining steps. The two players have A and B actions, respectively. There is no reward in the
first two steps and for the remaining steps, the agent always receives reward 1 if it is in the good state
and 0 otherwise.
• Transitions: after the first step, the agent will always transfer to a state in the second step uniformly at
random regardless of the action taken. In the second step, at each state s, there is a matrixMs sampled
independently and uniformly at random from M(ǫ/H). Here in stead of receiving a reward sampled
from Ber((Ms)ab) as in the matrix game, the agent will transfer to the good state with probability
(Ms)ab, and to the bad state with probability 1 − (Ms)ab, once action pair (a, b) is taken at state s.
After entering the good state or the bad state, the agent will stay there for the remaining steps.
Observe that in order to find a Θ(ǫ)-optimal policy for the above Markov game, we need to find a
Θ(ǫ/H)-optimal policy for at least half the matrix games in the second step. Therefore, the overall sample
complexity should be at least
Θ
(
AB
(ǫ/H)2
)
× S
2
= Θ
(
ABSH2
ǫ2
)
.
E Proof for Section 5 – Multiplayer General-sum Markov Games
E.1 Proof of Theorem 16
E.1.1 NE Version
In this section, we prove Theorem 16 (NE version). As before, we begin with proving the optimistic estima-
tions are indeed upper bounds of corresponding value and Q-value functions.
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Lemma 30. With probability 1− p, for any (s,a, h, k, i):
Q
k
h,i (s,a) ≥ Q
†,πk−i
h,i (s,a) , Q
k
h,i
(s,a) ≤ Qπkh,i (s,a) , (36)
V
k
h,i (s) ≥ V
†,πk−i
h,i (s) , V
k
h,i (s) ≤ V π
k
h,i (s) . (37)
Proof. For each fixed k, we prove this by induction from h = H + 1 to h = 1. For base case, we know at
the (H +1)-th step,V kH+1,i (s) = V
†,πk−i
H+1,i (s) = 0. Now, assume the inequality (37) holds for the (h+1)-th
step, for the h-th step, by definition of the Q functions,
Q
k
h,i (s,a)−Q
†,πk−i
h,i (s,a) =
[
P̂
k
hV
k
h+1,i
]
(s,a)−
[
PhV
†,πk−i
h+1,i
]
(s,a) + βt
=P̂kh
(
V
k
h+1,i − V
†,πk−i
h+1,i
)
(s,a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+
(
P̂
k
h − Ph
)
V
†,πk−i
h+1,i (s,a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+ βt.
By induction hypothesis, for any s′,
(
V
k
h+1,i − V
†,πk−i
h+1,i
)
(s′) ≥ 0, and thus (A) ≥ 0. By uniform
concentration (e.g., Lemma 12 in Bai and Jin [2]), (B) ≤ C
√
SH2ι/Nkh (s,a) = βt. Putting everything
together we have Qkh,i (s,a)−Q
†,πk−i
h,i (s,a) ≥ 0. The second inequality can be proved similarly.
Now assume inequality (36) holds for the h-th step, by definition of value functions and Nash equilib-
rium,
V
k
h,i (s) = DπkQ
k
h,i (s) = max
µ
Dµ×πk−i
Q
k
h,i (s) .
By Bellman equation,
V
†,πk−i
h,i (s) = maxµ
Dµ×πk−i
Q
†,πk−i
h,i (s) .
Since by induction hypothesis, for any (s,a), Q
k
h,i (s,a) ≥ Q
†,πk−i
h,i (s,a). As a result, we also have
V
k
h,i (s) ≥ V
†,πk−i
h,i (s), which is exactly inequality (37) for the h-th step. The second inequality can be
proved similarly.
Proof of Theorem 16. Let us focus on the i-th player and ignore the subscript when there is no confusion.
To bound
max
i
(
V
†,πk−i
1,i − V π
k
1,i
)(
skh
)
≤ max
i
(
V
k
1,i − V k1,i
)(
skh
)
,
we notice the following propogation:(Q
k
h,i −Qkh,i)(s,a) ≤ P̂kh(V
k
h+1,i − V kh+1,i)(s,a) + 2βkh(s,a),
(V h,i − V h,i)(s) = [Dπh(Q
k
h,i −Qkh,i)](s).
(38)
We can define Q˜kh and V˜
k
h recursively by V˜
k
H+1 = 0 and{
Q˜kh(s,a) = P̂
k
hV˜
k
h+1(s,a) + 2β
k
h(s,a),
V˜ kh (s) = [DπhQ˜
k
h](s).
(39)
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Then we can prove inductively that for any k, h, s and a we havemaxi (Q
k
h,i −Qkh,i)(s,a) ≤ Q˜
k
h(s,a),
max
i
(V h,i − V h,i)(s) ≤ V˜ kh (s).
(40)
Thus we only need to bound
∑K
k=1 V˜
k
1 (s). Define the shorthand notation
βkh := β
k
h(s
k
h,a
k
h),
∆kh := V˜
k
h (s
k
h),
ζkh := DπkQ˜
k
h
(
skh
)
− Q˜kh(skh,akh),
ξkh := PhV˜
k
h (s
k
h,a
k
h)−∆kh+1.
(41)
We can check ζkh and ξ
k
h are martingale difference sequences. As a result,
∆kh =DπkQ˜
k
h
(
skh
)
=ζkh + Q˜
k
h
(
skh,a
k
h
)
=ζkh + 2β
k
h + P̂
k
hV˜
k
h+1
(
skh,a
k
h
)
≤ζkh + 3βkh + PhV˜ kh+1
(
skh,a
k
h
)
=ζkh + 3β
k
h + ξ
k
h +∆
k
h+1.
Recursing this argument for h ∈ [H] and taking the sum,
K∑
k=1
∆k1 ≤
K∑
k=1
(
ζkh + 3β
k
h + ξ
k
h
)
≤ O
S
√√√√H3T ι M∏
i=1
Ai
 .
E.1.2 CCE Version
The proof is very similar to the NE version. Specifically, the only part that uses the properties of NE there
is Lemma 30. We prove a counterpart here.
Lemma 31. With probability 1− p, for any (s,a, h, k, i):
Q
k
h,i (s,a) ≥ Q
†,πk−i
h,i (s,a) , Q
k
h,i
(s,a) ≤ Qπkh,i (s,a) , (42)
V
k
h,i (s) ≥ V
†,πk−i
h,i (s) , V
k
h,i (s) ≤ V π
k
h,i (s) . (43)
Proof. For each fixed k, we prove this by induction from h = H + 1 to h = 1. For base case, we know at
the (H +1)-th step,V kH+1,i (s) = V
†,πk−i
H+1,i (s) = 0. Now, assume the inequality (37) holds for the (h+1)-th
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step, for the h-th step, by definition of the Q functions,
Q
k
h,i (s,a)−Q
†,πk−i
h,i (s,a) =
[
P̂
k
hV
k
h+1,i
]
(s,a)−
[
PhV
†,πk−i
h+1,i
]
(s,a) + βt
=P̂kh
(
V
k
h+1,i − V
†,πk−i
h+1,i
)
(s,a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+
(
P̂
k
h − Ph
)
V
†,πk−i
h+1,i (s,a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+ βt.
By induction hypothesis, for any s′,
(
V
k
h+1,i − V
†,πk−i
h+1,i
)
(s′) ≥ 0, and thus (A) ≥ 0. By uniform
concentration, (B) ≤ C
√
SH2ι/Nkh (s,a) = βt. Putting everything together we have Q
k
h,i (s,a) −
Q
†,πk−i
h,i (s,a) ≥ 0. The second inequality can be proved similarly.
Now assume inequality (42) holds for the h-th step, by definition of value functions and CCE,
V
k
h,i (s) = DπkQ
k
h,i (s) = max
µ
Dµ×πk−i
Q
k
h,i (s) .
By Bellman equation,
V
†,πk−i
h,i (s) = maxµ
Dµ×πk−i
Q
†,πk−i
h,i (s) .
Since by induction hypothesis, for any (s,a), Q
k
h,i (s,a) ≥ Q
†,πk−i
h,i (s,a). As a result, we also have
V
k
h,i (s) ≥ V
†,πk−i
h,i (s), which is exactly inequality (37) for the h-th step. The second inequality can be
proved similarly.
E.1.3 CE Version
The proof is very similar to the NE version. Specifically, the only part that uses the properties of NE there
is Lemma 30. We prove a counterpart here.
Lemma 32. With probability 1− p, for any (s,a, h, k, i):
Q
k
h,i (s,a) ≥ max
φ
Qφ◦π
k
h,i (s,a) , Q
k
h,i
(s,a) ≤ Qπkh,i (s,a) , (44)
V
k
h,i (s) ≥ max
φ
V φ◦π
k
h,i (s) , V
k
h,i (s) ≤ V π
k
h,i (s) . (45)
Proof. For each fixed k, we prove this by induction from h = H + 1 to h = 1. For base case, we know
at the (H + 1)-th step,V
k
H+1,i (s) = max
φ
V
φ◦πk
H+1,i (s) = 0. Now, assume the inequality (37) holds for the
(h+ 1)-th step, for the h-th step, by definition of the Q functions,
Q
k
h,i (s,a)−max
φ
Qφ◦π
k
h,i (s,a)
=
[
P̂
k
hV
k
h+1,i
]
(s,a)−
[
Phmax
φ
V φ◦π
k
h+1,i
]
(s,a) + βt
=P̂kh
(
V
k
h+1,i −max
φ
V φ◦π
k
h+1,i
)
(s,a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+
(
P̂
k
h − Ph
)
max
φ
V φ◦π
k
h+1,i (s,a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+ βt.
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By induction hypothesis, for any s′,
(
V
k
h+1,i −max
φ
V φ◦π
k
h+1,i
)
(s′) ≥ 0, and thus (A) ≥ 0. By uni-
form concentration, (B) ≤ C
√
SH2ι/Nkh (s,a) = βt. Putting everything together we have Q
k
h,i (s,a) −
max
φ
Qφ◦π
k
h,i (s,a) ≥ 0. The second inequality can be proved similarly.
Now assume inequality (44) holds for the h-th step, by definition of value functions and CE,
V
k
h,i (s) = DπkQ
k
h,i (s) = max
φ
Dφ◦πkQ
k
h,i (s) .
By Bellman equation,
max
φ
V φ◦π
k
h,i (s) = max
φ
Dφ◦πkmax
φ′
Qφ
′◦πk
h,i (s) .
Since by induction hypothesis, for any (s,a), Q
k
h,i (s,a) ≥ max
φ
Qφ◦π
k
h,i (s,a). As a result, we also have
V
k
h,i (s) ≥ max
φ
V φ◦π
k
h,i (s), which is exactly inequality (37) for the h-th step. The second inequality can be
proved similarly.
E.2 Proof of Theorem 17
In this section, we prove each theorem for the single reward function case, i.e., N = 1. The proof for the
case of multiple reward functions (N > 1) simply follows from taking a union bound, that is, replacing the
failure probability p by Np.
Algorithm 5Multiplayer Optimistic Value Iteration with Zero Reward (Multi-VI-Zero)
1: Initialize: for any (s,a, h), V˜h(s,a)← H ,∆← H , Nh(s,a)← 0.
2: for episode k = 1, . . . ,K do
3: for step h = H,H − 1, . . . , 1 do
4: for (s,a) ∈ S ×A1 × · · · × Am do
5: t← Nh(s,a).
6: if t > 0 then
7: Q˜h(s,a)← min{(P̂hV˜h+1)(s,a) + βt,H}.
8: for s ∈ S do
9: πh(s)← argmaxa∈A1×···×Am Q˜h(s,a).
10: V˜h(s)← (DπhQ˜h)(s).
11: if V˜1(s1) < ∆ then
12: ∆← V˜1(s1) and P̂out ← P̂.
13: for step h = 1, . . . ,H do
14: take action ah ∼ πh(·, ·|sh), observe next state sh+1.
15: add 1 to Nh(sh,ah) and Nh(sh,ah, sh+1).
16: P̂h(·|sh,ah)← Nh(sh,ah, ·)/Nh(sh,ah).
17: Output P̂out.
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E.2.1 NE version
Let (µk, νk) be an arbitrary Nash-equilibrium policy of M̂k := (P̂k, r), where P̂k is our empirical estimate
of the transition at the beginning of the k’th episode in Algorithm 5. Given an arbitrary Nash equilibrium
πk of M̂k, we use Q̂kh,i and V̂ kh,i to denote its value functions of the i’th player at the h’th step in M̂k.
We prove the following two lemmas, which together imply the conclusion about Nash equilibriums in
Theorem 17 as in the proof of Theorem 5.
Lemma 33. With probability 1− p, for any (h, s,a, i, k), we have{
|Q̂kh,i(s,a)−Qπ
k
h,i(s,a)| ≤ Q˜kh(s,a),
|V̂ kh,i(s)− V π
k
h,i (s)| ≤ V˜ kh (s).
(46)
Proof. For each fixed k, we prove this by induction from h = H + 1 to h = 1. For base case, we know at
the (H + 1)-th step,V̂ kH+1,i = V
πk
H+1,i = Q̂
k
H+1,i = Q
πk
H+1,i = 0. Now, assume the conclusion holds for the
(h+ 1)’th step, for the h’th step, by definition of the Q functions,∣∣∣Q̂kh,i (s,a)−Qπkh,i (s,a)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣[P̂khV̂ kh+1,i] (s,a)− [PhV πkh+1,i] (s,a)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣P̂kh (V̂ kh+1,i − V πkh+1,i) (s,a)∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+
∣∣∣(P̂kh − Ph)V πkh+1,i (s,a)∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
By the induction hypothesis,
(A) ≤ P̂kh
∣∣∣V̂ kh+1,i − V πkh+1,i∣∣∣ (s,a) ≤ (P̂khV˜ kh+1)(s,a).
By uniform concentration (e.g., Lemma 12 in Bai and Jin [2]), (B) ≤
√
SH2ι/Nkh (s,a) = βt. Putting
everything together we have∣∣∣Qπkh,i (s,a)− Q̂kh,i (s,a)∣∣∣ ≤ min{(P̂khV˜ kh+1)(s,a) + βt,H} = Q˜kh(s,a),
which proves the first inequality in (46). The inequality for V functions follows directly by noting that the
value functions are computed using the same policy πk.
Lemma 34. With probability 1− p, for any (h, s,a, i, k), we have|Q̂
k
h,i(s,a)−Q
πk−i,†
h,i (s,a)| ≤ Q˜kh(s,a),
|V̂ kh,i(s)− V
πk−i,†
h,i (s)| ≤ V˜ kh (s).
(47)
Proof. For each fixed k, we prove this by induction from h = H + 1 to h = 1. For base case, we know at
the (H + 1)-th step,V̂ kH+1,i = V
πk−i,†
H+1,i = Q̂
k
H+1,i = Q
πk−i,†
H+1,i = 0. Now, assume the conclusion holds for the
(h+ 1)’th step, for the h’th step, by definition of the Q functions,∣∣∣∣Q̂kh,i (s,a)−Qπk−i,†h,i (s,a)∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣[P̂khV̂ kh+1,i] (s,a)− [PhV πk−i,†h+1,i ] (s,a)∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣P̂kh(V̂ kh+1,i − V πk−i,†h+1,i) (s,a)∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+
∣∣∣∣(P̂kh − Ph)V πk−i,†h+1,i (s,a)∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
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By the induction hypothesis,
(A) ≤ P̂kh
∣∣∣∣V̂ kh+1,i − V πk−i,†h+1,i ∣∣∣∣ (s,a) ≤ (P̂khV˜ kh+1)(s,a).
By uniform concentration, (B) ≤
√
SH2ι/Nkh (s,a) = βt. Putting everything together we have∣∣∣∣Qπk−i,†h,i (s,a)− Q̂kh,i (s,a)∣∣∣∣ ≤ min{(P̂khV˜ kh+1)(s,a) + βt,H} = Q˜kh(s,a),
which proves the first inequality in (47). It remains to show the inequality for V functions also hold in h’th
step.
Since πk is a Nash-equilibrium policy, we have
V̂ kh,i (s) = max
µ
Dµ×πk−i
Q̂kh,i (s) .
By Bellman equation,
V
πk−i,†
h,i (s) = maxµ
Dµ×πk−i
Q
πk−i,†
h,i (s) .
Combining the two equations above, and utilizing the bound we just proved for Q functions, we obtain∣∣∣∣V̂ kh,i (s)− V πk−i,†h,i (s)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣maxµ Dµ×πk−iQ̂kh,i (s)−maxµ Dµ×πk−iQπk−i,†h,i (s)
∣∣∣∣
≤ max
a
Q˜kh(s,a) = V˜
k
h (s),
which completes the whole proof.
E.2.2 CCE version
The proof is almost the same as that for Nash equilibriums. We will reuse Lemma 33 and prove an analogue
of Lemma 34. The conclusion for CCEs will follow directly by combining the two lemmas as in the proof
of Theorem 5.
Lemma 35. With probability 1− p, for any (h, s,a, i, k), we haveQ
πk−i,†
h,i (s,a)− Q̂kh,i(s,a) ≤ Q˜kh(s,a),
V
πk−i,†
h,i (s)− V̂ kh,i(s) ≤ V˜ kh (s).
(48)
Proof. For each fixed k, we prove this by induction from h = H + 1 to h = 1. For base case, we know at
the (H + 1)-th step,V̂ kH+1,i = V
πk−i,†
H+1,i = Q̂
k
H+1,i = Q
πk−i,†
H+1,i = 0. Now, assume the conclusion holds for the
(h+ 1)’th step, for the h’th step, by definition of the Q functions,
Q
πk−i,†
h,i (s,a)− Q̂kh,i (s,a) =
[
PhV
πk−i,†
h+1,i
]
(s,a)−
[
P̂
k
hV̂
k
h+1,i
]
(s,a)
=P̂kh
(
V
πk−i,†
h+1,i − V̂ kh+1,i
)
(s,a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+
(
Ph − P̂kh
)
V
πk−i,†
h+1,i (s,a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
.
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By the induction hypothesis, (A) ≤ (P̂khV˜ kh+1)(s,a).
By uniform concentration, (B) ≤
√
SH2ι/Nkh (s,a) = βt. Putting everything together we have
Q
πk−i,†
h,i (s,a)− Q̂kh,i (s,a) ≤ min
{
(P̂khV˜
k
h+1)(s,a) + βt,H
}
= Q˜kh(s,a),
which proves the first inequality in (48). It remains to show the inequality for V functions also hold in h’th
step.
Since πk is a CCE, we have
V̂ kh,i (s) ≥ max
µ
Dµ×πk−i
Q̂kh,i (s) .
Observe that V
πk−i,†
h,i obeys the Bellman optimality equation, so we have
V
πk−i,†
h,i (s) = maxµ
Dµ×πk−i
Q
πk−i,†
h,i (s) .
Combining the two equations above, and utilizing the bound we just proved for Q functions, we obtain
V
πk−i,†
h,i (s)− V̂ kh,i (s) ≤ maxµ Dµ×πk−iQ
πk−i,†
h,i (s)−maxµ Dµ×πk−iQ̂
k
h,i (s)
≤ max
a
Q˜kh(s,a) = V˜
k
h (s),
which completes the whole proof.
E.2.3 CE version
The proof is almost the same as that for Nash equilibriums. We will reuse Lemma 33 and prove an analogue
of Lemma 34. The conclusion for CEs will follow directly by combining the two lemmas as in the proof of
Theorem 5.
Lemma 36. With probability 1− p, for any (h, s,a, i, k) and strategy modification φ for player i, we haveQ
φ◦πk
h,i (s,a)− Q̂kh,i(s,a) ≤ Q˜kh(s,a),
V φ◦π
k
h,i (s)− V̂ kh,i(s) ≤ V˜ kh (s).
(49)
Proof. For each fixed k, we prove this by induction from h = H + 1 to h = 1. For base case, we know at
the (H + 1)-th step,V̂ kH+1,i = V
φ◦πk
H+1,i = Q̂
k
H+1,i = Q
φ◦πk
H+1,i = 0. Now, assume the conclusion holds for the
(h+ 1)’th step, for the h’th step, following exactly the same argument as Lemma 35, we can show
Qφ◦π
k
h,i (s,a)− Q̂kh,i (s,a) ≤ min
{
(P̂khV˜
k
h+1)(s,a) + βt,H
}
= Q˜kh(s,a),
which proves the first inequality in (49). It remains to show the inequality for V functions also hold in h’th
step.
Since πk is a CE, we have
V̂ kh,i (s) = max
φ˜h,s
D
φ˜h,s◦πk
Q̂kh,i (s) ,
where the maximum is take over all possible injective functions from Ai to itself.
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Observe that V φ◦π
k
h,i obeys the Bellman optimality equation, so we have
V φ◦π
k
h,i (s) = max
φ˜h,s
D
φ˜h,s◦πk
Qφ◦π
k
h,i (s) .
Combining the two equations above, and utilizing the bound we just proved for Q functions, we obtain
V φ◦π
k
h,i (s)− V̂ kh,i (s) = max
φ˜h,s
D
φ˜h,s◦πk
Qφ◦π
k
h,i (s)−max
φ˜h,s
D
φ˜h,s◦πk
Q̂kh,i (s)
≤ max
a
Q˜kh(s,a) = V˜
k
h (s),
which completes the whole proof.
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